Like the political elites of India, Indonesia, and Nigeria, postcolonial Middle Eastern rulers have struggled to strengthen their states while accommodating plural societies. This has been particularly true of the multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian polities of Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, all of which have experienced violent ethnic or sectarian strife in the post-colonial era. In all of the aforementioned states, independence did not mean allegiance to the flags and borders bequeathed by the departing power. Instead, it inspired withdrawal into sub-state ideals of political community, and, conversely, the adoption of ideals like Pan-Arabism, which transcended state boundaries.1

The case of Iraq’s Kurdish minority under the rule of Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim provides a particularly illustrative example of the relationship between state centralization and ethnic violence in the postcolonial Middle East. The violent, often tragic history of Iraq’s Kurds is frequently explained in terms of Arab-Kurdish ethnic animosity, particularly after the Ba’th Party’s accession to power. A closer look at the Qasim period, however, reveals a less consistent pattern. Qasim’s confrontation with Iraq’s Kurds cannot be explained in terms of ethnic rivalry. Unlike his Hashemite predecessors and his Ba’thist successors, Qasim shied away from overt identification with Arab nationalism, in both foreign and domestic spheres. In the wake of the Egyptian-Syrian union of February 1958, he feared that Arab nationalist policies would invite Egyptian interference, and aid his Ba’thist and Nasserist rivals within Iraq.2

Yet, despite his lukewarm attitude toward Arab nationalism, Qasim was no champion of a pluralistic Iraq. First and foremost, he sought to centralize the state and consolidate its sovereign power. Iraq had gained qualified independence in 1932, but its sovereignty remained tenuous for the remainder of the Hashemite period. Political
power stayed divided between urban notables, high-ranking army officers, tribal leaders, and the royal court. They, in turn, owed their positions to their willingness to facilitate British interests in Iraq. Great Britain retained its local military bases, supplied the Iraqi army with most of its weapons, and played a key role in shaping Iraqi foreign policy. British businessmen, companies, and government officials continued to set Iraq’s economic agenda. Following the overthrow of the monarchy, Qasim sought to destroy Iraq’s old political elites and to curtail foreign interference in Iraqi affairs. At the same time, he remained wary of others who hoped to capitalize on the post-Hashemite power vacuum.

Qasim’s penchant for centralization typified his historical period. In the immediate postcolonial era, leaders of newly independent states in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East all pushed to consolidate the sovereign power of their states. They expanded their militaries, initiated state-led development projects, and enacted political and economic reforms designed to eradicate the vestiges of colonial order. Postcolonial rulers stripped landowning elites, tribes, and ethnic minorities of social privileges and corporate status in the name of socioeconomic equality, modernization and national unity. In plural societies, however, such efforts often served to estrange the targeted groups from their respective states. In many countries, including Iraq, such estrangement culminated in violence.

Iraq's Kurdish minority did not fare well under British or Hashemite rule, and fared far worse under the Arab nationalist regimes which dominated Iraq from 1963 onward. Yet, it was Qasim, Iraq’s first truly independent ruler, who initiated the Kurds’ estrangement from the Iraqi polity. He did not do so out of Arab nationalist fervour, but rather, in pursuit of centralization and sovereignty. In the early years of his regime, Qasim worked to undermine the power of Kurdish tribal elites, who had linked the old regime with Kurdish rural society. Meanwhile, he sought a way to bind the remainder of Iraq’s Kurds closer to the state. To do so, he invited Mulla Mustafa Barzani, a Kurdish chieftain and an opponent of the monarchy, back to Iraq from exile. Initially, Barzani proved a useful client. Qasim plied him and his followers with financial largesse and weapons. In return, Mulla Mustafa helped secure the loyalties of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and crush anti-regime resistance among Arab nationalists and pro-Hashemite Kurdish tribal leaders. By 1960, however, it became clear that Qasim refused to countenance expectations which the KDP and Mulla Mustafa took for granted. Barzani reserved the right to make war on his tribal rivals at will, with or without Qasim’s sanction. The KDP held fast to its demands for some form of Kurdish autonomy. Both parties’ aims would have compromised the sovereignty of the state, and Qasim sought to repress them accordingly. In the autumn of 1961, tensions between the two sides erupted into civil war.

Some scholars of Kurdish politics under Qasim have written blatantly pro-Kurdish or pro-Arab accounts of this period, plagued by the standard problems of nationalist historiography. Scholars sympathetic to Qasim have personalized the issue, portraying the ‘Kurdish war’ as an unfortunate, private blunder. Among them are the doyens of modern Iraqi history. 'The Kurdish war', Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett write, ‘was yet another example of Qasim’s apparent incapacity to remain on good terms with those who should have been his natural allies’. For the Slugletts, as well as Hanna Batatu, Qasim exhibited the potential to enact necessary socioeconomic changes and forge an
ethnically inclusive Iraqi polity. Instead, he failed to keep his squabbling coalition of supporters together, and was
ultimately deposed by more determined and ruthless Arab nationalists. In this narrative, Qasim appears as a tragic
hero. As a leader, he might have failed personally, but nevertheless represented a positive historical trajectory. He
may have yielded better results had he been luckier, more resolute, or more sympathetic to the Iraqi Communist
Party.

Contrary to the Slugletts’ claim, however, the Barzanis and the KDP were never Qasim’s ‘natural allies’. Lasting
political alliances are built upon a shared understanding of political community and norms. Qasim failed to establish
such an understanding with any Kurdish faction, regardless of class. Rather, he based his initial rapprochement with
the KDP and the Barzanis on financial patronage and shared enemies. The two sides failed to reach an
understanding of how much power could be allotted to Iraq’s Kurds while preserving the sovereignty of the state.
Neither Qasim nor his Kurdish interlocutors saw existing political channels as sufficiently legitimate for mediating their
disputes. Therefore, neither side had any reservations about the use of force. The state’s contested sovereignty
moulded the actions of both the ruler and the ruled.

In 1958, the Kurds of Iraq numbered roughly 1.25 million, about 20 per cent of Iraq’s total population. Most Iraqi
Kurds practised Sunni Islam, often tinged with the influences of different Sufi orders. The bulk of Iraq’s Kurdish
community remained concentrated in rural areas in northern Iraq. A majority of Kurds worked on the land as farmers
or herders, though many also found employment in the Kirkuk oil fields and state-initiated development projects.
Landownership was concentrated in the hands of a small number of aghas, who mediated between the Iraqi state
and the Kurdish peasantry. Chiefs of the Jaf, Dizai, and Mir Mahmali tribes all sat on the Higher Committee of Prime
Minister Nuri al-Sa’id’s Constitutional Union Party, established in 1947.5

The aghas’ role in Kurdish society, however, had been increasingly challenged since the 1930s. The first generation
of urban, educated, middle-class Kurds had reached adulthood, and sought a place for themselves within the nascent
Iraqi state. Many young, educated Kurds took a serious interest in Kurdish literature and culture, which often led them
to the cause of Kurdish self-determination. Meanwhile, their education and urbanity distanced them from the authority
of traditional tribal leaders.

The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), which advocated social justice and minority rights, proved an attractive home for
many young, educated Iraqi Kurds. A much smaller number became involved in specifically Kurdish political
organizations. These, however, failed to make inroads among either the Kurdish peasantry or the agha class. In
1943, the agha Mulla Mustafa Barzani led a revolt against the Iraqi government, but it was essentially tribal in
character. The major Kurdish nationalist party, Hiwa (Hope) failed to capitalize on it, and ceased to function by 1944.
In 1946, Barzani, who had fled to the short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in Iran, initiated the creation of the
Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq, a sister party to its eponymous Iranian counterpart.6 The party absorbed several
smaller Kurdish nationalist groupings, but also alienated many left-leaning Kurdish nationalists, who disliked the idea
of entrusting their economic and social concerns to Barzani and other tribal leaders.
In 1947, however, the Iranian government put an end to the Mahabad Republic, and Barzani fled to the Soviet Union. Thereafter, the KDP slowly became the preserve of left-wing, urban Kurdish intellectuals, led by Secretary-General Ibrahim Ahmad, a lawyer from Sulaymaniya. In the 1950s, the KDP moved closer to ICP, focusing on socioeconomic issues rather than a narrower Kurdish nationalist agenda. The party called for Kurdish autonomy under a republican government, as well as comprehensive land reform, the nationalization of the Iraqi oil industry, and development projects to absorb surplus labour in northern Iraq. This new programme allowed the party to attract a number of Kurds formerly affiliated to the ICP. The fusion of the two factions was temporarily renamed the United Kurdish Democratic Party (UKDP). Like all other opposition parties in Iraq, the KDP/UKDP was banned between 1954 and 1958.

By the end of the monarchic era, a majority of Iraq's Kurds faced the same difficulties as most other Iraqis - a generally repressive political environment, a wide gulf between rich and poor, and continued British interference in the country's affairs, despite its nominal independence. Meanwhile, the collapse of the Mahabad Republic and the consolidation of an anti-Soviet Northern Tier temporarily dampened Kurdish separatism. As C.J. Edmonds, a veteran British observer of Kurdish affairs summed up:

Since 1945, there has been little manifestation of Kurdish nationalism in any of the three countries [Turkey, Iran, and Iraq]. The intellectual leaders have been persuaded that for the time being, in the face of the opposition of the three governments, nothing could be done; they could only wait in the hope that some future international upheaval would give them or their sons an opportunity of renewing their movement with some chance of success.

To a certain extent, Iraq’s Kurds (with the exception of many aghas) moved closer to other anti-monarchic forces, including communists, Pan-Arabists, and anti-regime liberals. Indeed, in this period, the ICP attracted many more Kurdish members than the UKDP. Baha al-Din Nuri, a Kurd from the Sulaymaniya area, headed the party between 1949 and 1953. Between 1949 and 1955, all of the ICP’s General Secretaries were Kurds, as were 31.3 per cent of its Central Committee members.

Yet, in spite of their increasing willingness to take part in the Iraqi opposition at large, many Iraqi Kurds continued to interpret the overarching concerns of the era through particularistic lenses. Iraq’s accession to the Baghdad Pact in 1955, for example, was opposed by both Iraqi Pan-Arabists and communists on the grounds that it aided and abetted Western imperialism. For many Iraqi Kurds, it also represented an unholy alliance which brought together three enemies of Kurdish nationalism - the governments of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. In February 1958, when Egypt and Syria joined in a ‘United Arab Republic’ (UAR), the Hashemite kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan allied in a counter-federation, the ‘Arab Union’. This move was broadly unpopular throughout Iraq, but particularly among the Kurdish population. The Arab Union’s proposed constitution did not even mention Iraq. Many Kurds resented the idea of contributing Iraqi tax monies to Jordan, a state with no significant Kurdish population and no regard for Kurdish interests.

Even aghas closely aligned with the monarchy often mixed the general concerns of the landowning elite with a sense of Kurdish particularism. In December 1956, toward the end of the Suez Crisis, a group of Kurdish aghas,
representing several landowning families, approached the British consul in Mosul, asking him to secure arms and money for a separatist rebellion. The monarchy, they told him, could no longer guarantee their interests. They would be safer in an anti-communist, independent Kurdistan. Unlike Hashemite Iraq, a state founded upon common ethnic ties would possess the legitimacy necessary to secure their material welfare. At the time of the Hashemite monarchy’s demise, Iraq’s Kurds were united neither by class interests nor by political allegiances. Yet all factions of Kurdish society, peasants and aghas, communists and nationalists, had reasons to distrust the state’s ability to guarantee their political and economic well-being. Some Kurds responded to this by embracing the egalitarianism of the ICP. Others, like the UKDP and certain aghas, decided that it behoved Kurds to secure their own interests by struggling for autonomy or independence.

On 14 July 1958, the Hashemite monarchy was toppled by a military coup organized by a small clique of army officers. Soldiers shot the royal family dead with machine guns in the courtyard of Rihab Palace. Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, disguised as a woman, was discovered and killed by a mob as he attempted to flee the country. The ‘Free Officers’, led by Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif assumed control. They imposed martial law, but also established a three-man Sovereignty Council and a cabinet to run the country’s political affairs. The Free Officers abolished the Hashemite monarchy, declared Iraq a republic, withdrew from the Arab Union, and ceased sending Iraqi representatives to Baghdad Pact meetings. The Hashemite era, with all of its colonial implications, had ended.

On the surface, the Revolution did not seem to bode poorly for Iraq’s Kurds. The Free Officers’ Central Committee consisted entirely of Arabs, but the lower ranks of the movement included Kurdish officers, some of whom took part in the Baghdad takeover. At this initial stage, neither Qasim nor Arif wished to openly court the UKDP, but both clearly felt the need to make gestures of inclusion. The second article of the Provisional Constitution, promulgated two weeks after the coup, stated that ‘Arabs and Kurds are partners in the Homeland’, and guaranteed both groups their ‘national rights’. Qasim freed numerous Kurdish political prisoners incarcerated by the ancien régime, including Shaykh Ahmad Barzani, Mulla Mustafa’s older brother. Two Kurds attained minor roles in the new government. Khalid Naqshabandi, former mutasarrif of Irbil, was named to the Sovereignty Council. Baba Ali, a Western-educated businessman and the son of the famed Shaykh Mahmud Barzinji, was appointed Minister of Communications and Public Works. Both men were from wealthy, landed families.

Nevertheless, even the most prominent Kurdish beneficiaries of the Free Officers’ gestures remained sceptical of their intentions. As Baba Ali told one American diplomat that July, the inclusive language of the Provisional Constitution meant little: ‘These are paper promises which the Kurds have heard before.’ It was more important, he remarked, that the ‘infection of Arab nationalism wouldn’t spoil the good and necessary thing’ which had occurred in Iraq. Shortly after his appointment, the Kurdish minister had visited Cairo, along with other Iraqi delegates. He had been personally impressed by Nasser, he told his American interlocutor, but feared what Pan-Arabism might do to Iraq.
The Iraqi Free Officers took power at the height of Pan-Arabism's popularity, epitomized by the formation of the United Arab Republic earlier that year, and personified by Nasser, its president. The Egyptian leader had been approached by the Free Officers with requests for clandestine assistance prior to July 1958. He had politely turned them down. Nasser had no desire for a post-Suez confrontation with the Western powers, and was preoccupied with the difficulties of implementing Arab unity with Syria.  

Nasser's lukewarm attitude, however, was ignored by the Western powers and his regional rivals, who saw the Iraqi Revolution as an Egyptian bid for hegemony. Within a week of the Iraqi coup, US Marines landed on the beaches of Lebanon, and British paratroopers arrived in Jordan to bolster the Hashemite monarchy. The leaders of Turkey and Iran, fearing the consequences of a pro-Soviet, pro-Nasser state on their borders, prepared for the worst. The Turkish government even asked the United States to provide air cover for a Turkish invasion of Iraq. They protested too much. On 19 July, Arif and three other Iraqi cabinet officials met with Nasser in Damascus, and signed an agreement pledging cooperation between Iraq and the UAR on matters of defence, foreign affairs, economy, and culture. The agreement, however, lacked any operative dimension, reflecting Nasser's lack of desire for unity with Iraq at the time.  

Still, the question of Iraqi accession to the UAR remained outstanding, and became entangled in the political rivalries of the country's new rulers. Both Qasim and Arif aspired to dominance, and the issue of Arab unity provided them with a ready battleground. Qasim, the stronger party, did not want to see his bid for leadership smothered in Nasser's embrace. Moreover, an anti-unionist position would provide him with the support of the Iraqi Communist Party, the country's most powerful political faction. Arif, the weaker man, believed that he, Nasser, and the Syrian Ba'th party could help one another. He would promote Arab unity and bring Iraq into the UAR, heightening Nasser's prestige while reducing Egyptian involvement in Syrian affairs. In return, Nasser and the Syrian Ba'thists would help him and Iraq's small collection of Pan-Arabists overcome Qasim and the ICP.  

At this time, Iraqi Kurdish attitudes toward Nasserist Pan-Arabism remained undefined. Certainly, union with the UAR would transform the Kurds into a tiny minority in a large Arab state. Yet, throughout the 1950s, many Kurdish nationalists maintained guarded respect for Nasser, who represented opposition to the status quo in Iraq, if not a viable alternative to it. During the Suez Crisis of 1956, Mulla Mustafa Barzani had volunteered to bring Kurdish fighters to Nasser's aid. Sa'id Qazzaz, the Iraqi Minister of the Interior, feared that the USSR might assist Egypt by parachuting 'Mulla Mustafa and his partisans' into Iraq. Nasser, for his part, had done his best to cultivate Kurdish opposition to the Iraqi monarchy, beaming anti-Hashemite propaganda in Kurdish over Iraq's radio waves. To a certain extent, it seems that his efforts bore fruit. In Sulaymaniya, photographs of Nasser circulated along with pictures of Barzani and Qazi Muhammad following the 14th July Revolution. The closest ties between Nasser and the Kurdish nationalists, however, existed in the minds of Iranian and Turkish officials, who doubted the loyalties of their own Kurdish citizens. Two weeks before the coup in Iraq, the Shah of Iran told American President Dwight Eisenhower that 'through broadcasts from Radio Cairo, the Communists are now stirring up the Kurds to fight for a free Kurdistan'. The 14th July Revolution heightened Turkish and Iranian fear of a Kurdish-Nasserist axis. On 19 July 1958, Turkey's ambassador to Washington told his American counterparts that
‘the Egyptians are now at work to incite a Kurdish movement for an independent state’, which would ‘cut a chain across the northern tier countries’. Similarly, General Timur Bakhtiyar, head of the Iranian intelligence services (SAVAK), worried aloud about ‘the possibility of the United Arab Republic establishing a Kurdish state under its influence…’

Abd al-Karim Qasim seems to have shared the fears of the Iranian and Turkish governments, but in reverse order. For Qasim, the possibility of Nasser backing Kurdish separatism was less dangerous than the chance that certain Kurds might back Nasser’s local proxy, Arif, in a power struggle. Kurdish nationalism represented both an opportunity and a threat to Qasim. If he could properly cultivate Kurdish fears of Pan-Arabism, he could gain a valuable ally in future conflicts with Arif and his sympathizers, and broaden his power base. Yet there was a risk that the UKDP might regard unity with the UAR as inevitable, and gamble on Arif in hope of securing Kurdish rights later. Ibrahim Ahmad, the Secretary-General of the UKDP, visited Qasim shortly after the Revolution and suggested that the Provisional Constitution include a clause granting Iraq’s Kurds autonomy. Qasim decided to postpone the matter until a permanent constitution was drafted. The following month, Ahmad began courting Arif. Ahmad’s moves annoyed Qasim, and strengthened his determination to wean the Kurds away from Nasser, while avoiding major concessions to them. Doing so might allow Arif or another rival in the military to mobilize opposition to Qasim on Arab nationalist grounds. It could also inspire the UKDP to make additional demands.

By September, Qasim had arrived at a solution, though not an optimal one. He would invite Mulla Mustafa Barzani back to Iraq. Qasim had ignored Barzani’s first request for the right to return to Iraq, sent from the UAR embassy in Bucharest on 21 or 22 August. On 29 August, the legendary Kurdish fighter telegraphed once again, this time from Prague. Three days later, the Iraqi Premier finally responded, offering Barzani amnesty and the option to return to Iraq. Qasim’s initial silence said as much about his feelings toward Barzani as did his invitation. His ambivalence was not unwarranted. After all, Barzani presented Qasim with serious risks. American and British officials would see his return as a Soviet gambit. Turkey and Iran, already alarmed by the spectre of Kurdish separatism, might grow even more hostile toward the nascent Iraqi republic. Domestically, Qasim’s Pan-Arabist rivals might use Barzani’s return as an occasion to question his fealty to Arab nationalism. And, of course, there was the matter of Barzani’s fellow Kurds. Would his return bind them closer to the state, or inspire separatism? Apparently, Qasim decided it was worth the risk. Bringing Barzani back would hopefully placate Kurdish nationalist sentiment, while sidelining Ahmad and preventing Arif from making inroads among the Kurds. The loyalty of the Kurdish nationalists would give Qasim added freedom to suppress those who remained outside his camp, specifically, Arif and his allies. The Prime Minister moved against Arif shortly after he offered Barzani amnesty, dismissing him from the deputy premiership on 30 September, and sending him to West Germany as ambassador on 12 October.

At the end of September, the KDP sent a delegation, headed by Ibrahim Ahmad, to accompany Barzani on his triumphant journey back to Iraq. The group arrived in Cairo on 3 October, where they met with Nasser. Diplomatic sources close to the Egyptian leader indicated that the meeting had been Barzani’s idea. He had few expectations
that the Egyptian President would back Kurdish separatism, and simply wished to pay homage to Nasser. A contemporaneous interview with Barzani in *al-Ahram* seems to confirm the symbolic nature of his visit. In it, he recounted his legendary march to the Soviet Union, and proclaimed Kurdish solidarity with the Egyptian revolution. Such statements placed Kurdish nationalism on the right side of history without incurring any political cost. Qasim, Arif, and the state of Iraqi affairs went entirely unmentioned. He made no mention of his political future, except to say that his Kurdish confidantes in the Soviet Union would return to Iraq soon, having also received amnesty.

The Kurdish leader’s return to Iraq was a relatively quiet affair. A crowd of approximately 5,000 people awaited him at Baghdad Airport on 6 October, but many had apparently come to see an Algerian delegation arriving that same day. No unrest was reported in Iraq’s Kurdish regions. Barzani remained in Baghdad for the next week and a half, receiving well-wishers at his hotel and making speeches, stressing Arab-Kurdish unity and his loyalty to Qasim. On 16 October, he left Baghdad to tour northern Iraq, returning to the capital a few weeks later.

From October 1958 until late 1959, Qasim did his best to transform Barzani and his confidantes into state functionaries. The extent of these efforts has been exaggerated by Arab nationalist historians, one of whom argues that Qasim made Barzani ‘the second [most important] personality in the Republic’. This particular claim seems dubious, but the Kurdish chieftain and his followers did benefit from the Premier’s largesse. Barzani received the former residence of Nuri al-Sa’id’s son, the Regent Abd al-Ilah’s car, and a generous stipend of 500 Iraqi dinars per month. His sons and his brother, Shaykh Ahmad Barzani, also received government stipends. In April 1959, 820 of Barzani’s followers from the USSR arrived at Basra aboard the Soviet ship *Gruzia*. Qasim quickly funnelled the new arrivals into civil service roles - teaching positions in Sulaymaniya, forestry projects in the Irbil liwa, interpreters for visiting Soviet officials, and, most controversially, administrators of agrarian reform. The Premier also supplied the Barzanis with 89,000 dinars to build houses and to improve village living conditions in their home region.

In return, Qasim used Barzani to help reduce Ibrahim Ahmad’s influence in the UKDP, and to bring the party closer to other supporters of his regime, particularly the ICP. Barzani aligned himself with Ahmad’s opponents in the UKDP, particularly Hamza Abdallah, a former KDP Secretary-General who had also spent time in the ICP’s ranks. In November 1958, they pressured Ahmad into signing a ‘Covenant of Cooperation’ with the ICP, and by January, forced Ahmad out of his position as Secretary-General. Hamza ‘Abdallah inherited the role, and the UKDP joined the ICP-led United National Front. These moves acknowledged the ICP’s rising stock in Iraqi politics, and confirmed the UKDP’s place in the pro-Qasim arena. At the same time, they served to protect the party and Barzani from allegations of separatism. Qasim made doubly sure of Barzani’s loyalties by pressuring him to remain in Baghdad, allowing him only periodic visits to northern Iraq. In the capital, he enjoyed frequent audiences with Qasim, and was featured at pro-regime rallies, decrying ‘imperialism’ and calling for Arab-Kurdish brotherhood.

Meanwhile, hostility mounted between Qasim’s supporters and their Pan-Arabist opponents. In November, Arif returned to Iraq and was immediately imprisoned. Shortly thereafter, Qasim exposed a coup plot in the army, masterminded by veteran Pan-Arabist Rashid Ali al-Gaylani. Arif’s supporters clashed with the Partisans of Peace, the ICP’s mass organization, in Baghdad, Ramadi, Falluja, Mosul, and Kirkuk. In March 1959, tension reached a
bloody climax in Mosul. On 8 March, Colonel Abd al-Wahhab Shawwaf, commander of the Iraqi army’s Fifth Brigade, set up a radio transmitter in Mosul, with UAR assistance. He began broadcasting attacks on Qasim, accusing him of opening the country to ‘foreign control’, while his armed supporters attacked local communists and Christians. Qasim responded by ordering an air strike on Shawwaf’s headquarters. On 9 March, the revolt reached its climax, as the Arab Shammar tribe and other supporters of Shawwaf clashed with communists and their allies. By the time the violence ended on 11 March, at least 200 Iraqis had been killed; estimates ranged as high as 5,000 at the time. The extent and character of Kurdish involvement in the suppression of the Mosul revolt is open to question. The UKDP party branch in Mosul certainly cooperated with the ICP, and summoned armed Kurds from the outskirts of the city. Hanna Batatu draws on testimonies of ICP members to indicate that some Kurds, including several Barzanis, participated in summary executions of Shawwaf’s supporters. Western sources depict the role of the UKDP and the Barzanis as fairly insignificant. According to American and British intelligence sources, the most important Kurdish participants in the revolt were the Kurdish soldiers of the Mosul garrison, who turned on Shawwaf’s followers. One Syrian intelligence officer, Lieutenant Colonel Marwan Siba’i, believed that the Kurdish soldiers had ‘severely crippled [the] rebellion at [the] decisive stage’. However one evaluates the Kurdish role in the Mosul rebellion, the episode clearly marked the high point of Qasim’s relations with both the ICP and pro-regime Kurds. That April, Barzani and his followers received the ultimate token of Qasim’s trust - weapons. Mahmud al-Durra, citing sources in the Iraqi military, estimates that they received 1,000 machine guns and an ammunition stockpile to protect the Prime Minister against his Pan-Arabist opponents. Ironically, the Barzanis did not take up arms against supporters of Arif or Nasser, but against their fellow Kurds instead. The fall of the monarchy endangered the power and prestige of Iraqi Kurdistan’s most powerful landowning aghas. Some feared that Qasim’s plans for land redistribution would strip them of their wealth and power, and reduce their standing in the eyes of fellow tribesmen. Those who had enjoyed close relations with the monarchy feared political reprisal. The newly-returned, empowered Barzanis threatened to avenge themselves upon their traditional opponents. The UKDP and the ICP seemed poised to compete with the aghas for the loyalties of the Kurdish peasantry. In many cases, all of these pressures converged, pitting the traditional strongmen of Iraqi Kurdistan against Qasim’s drive for sovereignty and centralization. Many Kurdish aghas feared the new regime from the beginning, but their trepidation intensified in the autumn of 1958. In September, Qasim invited Barzani back to Iraq, and announced his plans for comprehensive agrarian reform. The plan established ceilings on the number of dunams (0.62 of an acre) one person could own, and established rules for land redistribution among the peasantry and the compensation of landlords. The plan did not seek to ruin Iraq’s landed elites. It would have granted them significant compensation and continued ownership of substantial amounts of land. Yet chaos resulted. Internal security in the countryside deteriorated. In some cases, peasants attacked landlords. In others, landlords abandoned their lands outright, leaving their fields full of rotting crops. Outside of Baghdad, civil service posts, particularly provincial and district governorships remained in the hands of conservative, pro-Hashemite officials, who sought to delay land redistribution through bureaucratic means. As a
result of all these factors, Iraq’s 1959 harvest constituted less than half of its usual total. Relatively little land was actually redistributed during Qasim’s rule. In September 1963, seven months after the Brigadier’s overthrow and death, only 1,800,461 dunams had been distributed to 35,104 peasant families, with additional quantities of land leased by the state-run Organization for the Temporary Management of Agrarian Reform. 33 In Iraqi Kurdistan, the Agrarian Reform Law had the immediate effect of shaking the precarious foundations of tribal authority. Both urban and rural Kurds, according to C.J. Edmonds, ‘were already in a state of mind to welcome the Russophile republicanism of Abdul Kerim Kassem and the Bolshevik slogans canonizing the peasants and the workmen and stirring up scorn and hatred of the Valley Lords, that is the Aghas and the Landlords’. 34 The case of Hamza Bapir Agha, a Pizhdar chieftain, aptly demonstrates the rising tensions between peasant and agha in northern Iraq. In December 1958, four Kurdish government employees came to his village, and informed the local peasants about the Agrarian Reform Programme. Hamza sent his wife and children away, and set off to confront the bearers of bad news, with the intention of killing them. He found them seated together in a room, and drew a pistol. Before he could fire, they blew out the room’s lamp, forcing him to fire at random, wounding only one man. He fled to Iran immediately thereafter. 35 The anti-regime aghas feared that Qasim would shut them out of Iraqi political life as well as confiscate their lands and turn the peasantry against them. Many prominent aghas had enjoyed cosy relations with the Hashemite monarchy and its British allies. Abu Bakr Agha, a Pizhdar agha, had visited Great Britain several times prior to 1958, and received a British stipend. His son, Bayazid Agha, had served in the Chamber of Deputies, the Iraqi parliament.

In exchange for its allegiances, the entire Pizhdar tribe had enjoyed freedom from military service. Fatah Agha, the leader of the Harki tribe, had also served in the Chamber of Deputies, as had Sidiq Miran, a prominent agha of the Khoshnaw tribe, and Da’ud and Hamid al-Jaf, aghas of the massively landed Jaf tribe. 36 By uprooting the old political system, Qasim had destroyed the aghas’ ability to pursue their interests through official channels.

Qasim’s patronage of Barzani compounded the damage. To many aghas, it seemed that Qasim sought to impose the one-man rule of an ‘outsider’ upon their disparate spheres of influence. Such feelings ran particularly strong among the leaders of the Zibari, Dizai, Aku, Surchi, and Harki tribes, all of whom had distanced themselves from the Barzanis during the mid-1940s. The Iraqi government seems to have made at least one half-hearted attempt to dampen these old enmities. In September 1958, Shaykh Ahmad Barzani and Mahmud Zibari actually shook hands and swore ‘to keep the peace as good neighbors’ in Abd al-Wahhab Shawwaf’s office. It meant little. In November 1959, Mahmud Zibari was murdered in Mosul by agents of Mulla Mustafa. 37 Many aghas attempted to avoid Mahmud Zibari’s fate through flight. The principal anti-regime tribes lived along the Iranian and Turkish borders, and many were semi-nomadic. It is difficult to determine exactly how many Kurds left Iraq in the two years following the Revolution. American and British diplomats estimated that about 8,000 Kurds, including some seasonal migrants, had settled in Iran by July 1959. The Turkish government estimated that between 700 and 1,500 Kurds had settled in Turkey in the same period. William Eagleton, Jr., an American diplomat and an expert on Kurdish affairs, estimated that between the Revolution and the autumn of 1960, approximately 2,000 Kurds fled northern Iraq and settled in Iran. Whatever the actual number (which clearly underwent a series of fluctuations),
these estimates are all fairly small relative to the total Kurdish population of Iraq. Yet, many of the refugees held high positions in the hierarchies of different Kurdish tribal confederations. Hence, the importance of their flight far exceeded its numerical weight. By January 1959, for example, no less than 30 Pizhdar aghashad encamped in Iran.38

The Kurds who fled to Iran soon entangled themselves in Iraqi-Iranian competition for Kurdish loyalties, which began following the July Revolution. Such competition was relatively muted at first. Both countries increased the quantity of Kurdish-language broadcasting on state airwaves. In November 1958, the Government of Iran announced the allocation of $2,132,000 to economic development projects in Iranian Kurdistan.39

Over time, however, Iranian military and political leaders came to view Iraq’s conservative aghas as potential military allies. Many of Iran’s national security elites longed to overthrow Qasim. They resented the loss of a Baghdad Pact ally, and feared the implications of Qasim’s overtures to the ICP and the UKDP, as well as Iraqi designs on the Shatt al-Arab.40 Some believed they should strike quickly, before Qasim consolidated his power or before a communist takeover. Major General Hamid Shirvani, commander of the Second Army Corps believed that his corps could ‘reach Baghdad in six hours’, if the United States and Britain would allow it. General Karim Vahrahram, commander of the Third Army Corps, entertained similar thoughts, and believed that the use of Kurdish tribal fighters would accelerate the process.

As commander of forces in Iran’s Mahabad region, Vahrahram proved important in determining Iranian policy toward Iraq’s anti-regime aghas. Those who arrived in Iran received decent, sometimes handsome treatment. The Pizhdars attained temporary housing, rations, and Iranian identity cards, and were permitted to keep their weapons. Da’ud Jaf, who crossed into Iran in May 1959, received a house in Kermanshah, a car, and a government stipend.41 Such patronage, however, had its limits. From the autumn of 1958 onward, American and British diplomats warned Vahrahram and other Iranian officials not to encourage Kurdish activity against Qasim. British and American officials in Iraq regarded Kurdish separatism unfavourably (though this did not prevent certain Kurds, including Da’ud Jaf, from requesting American and British backing).42 They feared that the aghas were too weak to make more than a dent in the regime’s armour, and that a rebellion would drive Qasim further leftward.43 Qasim lent credence to such notions by verbally pre-empting external interference in Kurdish affairs. In November 1958, he publicly enjoined against ‘imperialists’ who had allegedly distributed maps of an independent Kurdistan and money to some Iraqi Kurds.44 Hence, the Iranian government sought to restrain both Vahrahram and the anti-regime aghas. In the autumn of 1958, Vahrahram deferred requests for weapons from Pizhdar and Harki tribal leaders. In March 1959, the general had prepared plans to launch a Kurdish tribal revolt if an anti-communist rebellion occurred. His superiors refused to let him act at the time of the Mosul uprising.45

Western pressure, however, could not prevent the Iranian government from backing smaller forays against Qasim. In April 1959, tensions between Qasim, Iran, and the aghas of Kurdistan exploded into violence. Baradost tribesmen led by the Sufi shaykh Rashid of Lawlan attacked government offices in the Rawanduz area.46 The Iraqi army and air force, assisted by Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s fighters and the Popular Resistance Forces, an ICP-dominated militia, launched counterattacks on the Kurdish tribesmen. The rebellion peaked on 14 May, when Shaykh Rashid’s men
fought a pitched battle against a combined force of Iraqi troops and Barzani tribesmen, led by Mulla Mustafa himself. By the 16th, most of the rebels had fled across the border to Iran, returning to attack Iraqi border guards by night. At the same time, the army, the Barzanis, and the PRF suppressed a Pizhdar rising in southern Kurdistan. During the course of the fighting, Iranian army units supplied the rebels with food, 200 German-made rifles and 20,000 rounds of ammunition. American and British officials watched with annoyance, particularly after the ICP’s newspaper accused the United States of distributing arms to the rebels.47

Fighting flared up again in June when Qasim refused to allow Harki tribesmen to cross into Iran, in accordance with their normal seasonal migration pattern. The Harkis were forced to encamp on abandoned Baradost lands near the Iranian border. They appealed to Shaykh Rashid for aid. He responded by sending riflemen across the border, igniting clashes with the Iraqi army. On 25 June, Qasim announced that he would grant amnesty to ‘all villagers and tribesmen in mountainous areas of Iraq who had taken part in recent local disputes’. The fighting subsequently died down, and Qasim began the delicate work of repairing relations with his ‘feudalist’ Kurdish opponents. Aghas and tribesmen who had fled during the rebellion trickled back into Iraq, including Shaykh Rashid. On 18 September, a delegation of Baradost Kurds visited Qasim in Baghdad to pay homage and symbolically end their rebellion.48

The ‘Lawlan rebellion’ epitomized the basic dilemma of sovereignty which continued to plague Qasim’s Iraq. The anti-regime aghas did not believe that the Iraqi political system could offer them anything more than the privileges they had enjoyed under the Hashemites. Their loyalty to the colonially-created Iraqi polity derived entirely from the benefits it bestowed. Once the state’s largesse found new beneficiaries, flight, violence, and entreaties to foreign patrons were weapons of first resort. Qasim, for his part, made no serious effort to address their grievances, responding instead by patronizing the aghas’ enemies and using violence when necessary. In a different context, the conciliatory gestures which followed the Lawlan rebellion might have marked the beginning of relative peace between the Iraqi state and its Kurdish citizens. In fact, they merely portended Qasim’s latest attempt to shore up the fortunes of his regime, by re-shuffling its clients and its victims.

The Lawlan Rebellion coincided with the peak of communist power in Iraq. After the Mosul rebellion, Qasim purged numerous Pan-Arabist officers from the Iraqi military, and replaced many with ICP members. The party attracted large numbers of Iraqis to its demonstrations and rallies, and to its various auxiliary organizations. Its meteoric rise led to tension with Qasim, who feared that its leaders might seek to replace him with one of their own.

The turning point came that summer, when, in mid-July, Kirkuk erupted in violence. The city was sharply divided between a largely middle class, socially conservative Turkmen population, and a largely working-class Kurdish population, many of whom sympathized with the ICP. On 14 July 1959, the first anniversary of the Revolution, the two groups provoked one another during celebratory street parades. Between 31 and 79 people were killed by the time the violence ended. Arab nationalists like Mahmud al-Durra later implicated Kurdish nationalists, charging them with acting ‘as the Jews acted in the capture of Dayr Yassin’.49 Qasim blamed the ICP, ordered the arrests of hundreds of party members, and sharply curtailed the activities of its affiliate groups. The communists enjoyed a brief revival in
the late autumn of 1959, when a group of Ba'thists tried to assassinate Qasim, temporarily diverting his suspicions. But the ICP did not receive a licence in the winter of 1960, when Qasim formally legalized political party activity in Iraq. Its power and numbers continued to decline for the remainder of Qasim's reign. As Qasim's relations with the communists soured, Barzani and the UKDP took a number of steps to avoid guilt by association, especially after numerous Kurds were implicated in the Kirkuk riots. In both September and October, Mulla Mustafa paid highly publicized visits to Qasim following trips to northern Iraq. Each time, he pledged his loyalty to the Iraqi Prime Minister. At their second meeting, he wore traditional Kurdish garb for the first time since his return to Iraq, abandoning the image of a pro-Soviet freedom fighter for that of a Kurdish agha. The Barzanis also made efforts to realign the UKDP with the new political climate. For some time, Mulla Mustafa had remained largely aloof from the party's doctrinal and bureaucratic politics. In the autumn of 1959, however, he purged the party of many of its pro-ICP members, including Secretary-General Hamza Abdallah, whom Ibrahim Ahmad replaced. The Barzanis' moves may have temporarily placated Qasim, who was preoccupied with weakening the ICP at the time. But the UKDP did not escape his suspicion either. In October 1959, the party published a new constitution, which referenced its 'debt to Marxist-Leninist doctrine' and its aspiration to Kurdish autonomy. Qasim objected to both, and Ahmad grudgingly altered the document's wording. In exchange, Qasim conferred both legality and a new name (the Kurdish Democratic Party) upon the UKDP in the winter of 1960. Neither of those things could substitute for trust between Iraq's ruler and its increasingly wary Kurdish nationalists.

Indeed, Qasim's Kurdish policy had already begun to shift in November 1959, when Barzani tribesmen murdered Mahmud Zibari in Mosul. Following the killing, the chiefs of the Zibari, Surchi, and Raikani tribes petitioned Qasim for protection, indicating that they no longer felt isolated from the Premier. Having made his peace with the Lawlan rebels, Qasim had little desire for the Barzanis to attack rival tribes, which could create civil unrest and invite foreign interference. Skirmishes between the Zibaris and Barzanis began in February 1960. By April, Qasim quietly began arming the Zibaris with rifles and ammunition. As clashes between the two tribes intensified, Qasim and Mulla Mustafa competed for the loyalties of the aghas they had previously fought together. In the spring, Barzani toured northern Iraq, meeting with leaders of the Harki, Baradost, and Pizhdar tribes. His followers made further appeals to the Baradost when fighting worsened in October. Qasim received a delegation of the Jaf tribe in March, Harki and Surchi delegations in May, and Baradost and Khoshnaw delegations in August. When the Barzanis appealed to the Baradost for aid that autumn, Qasim gave Shaykh Rashid 60,000 dinars to turn them down. In the same period, Mulla Mustafa also made at least one overture to a foreign power. In February 1960, he secretly asked the British ambassador, Humphrey Trevelyan for a written pledge of British friendship with his tribe. Trevelyan said no. At the end of October 1960, the fighting died down. Shaykh Rashid and representatives of the Harki, Surchi, Raikani, and Zibari tribes met to coordinate continued armed attacks, while Mulla Mustafa sought solace and aid in a visit to the USSR. Qasim had attained a precarious victory in the struggle for the aghas' allegiances, and he moved to finish off his rival while he still could. In January 1961, when intra-tribal fighting resumed, he ordered the Barzanis to return the rifles he had previously issued them. When Mulla Mustafa returned from the Soviet Union later that month, Qasim confiscated his car, evicted him from his Baghdad residence, and cut off his tribe's monthly
stipend. Previously, Qasim sought to strengthen his sovereignty by granting Mulla Mustafa money and a licence for state-sanctioned violence. Now, he could exercise his sovereign prerogative by withdrawing both.

As Qasim worked to suppress the Barzanis in the countryside, he moved to silence the KDP’s party apparatus as well. The party leaders’ hopes, having risen so rapidly in 1958, remained unfulfilled by Qasim. Autonomy, political or cultural, remained a distant aspiration. High unemployment continued to plague Iraqi Kurdistan. Following the KDP’s legalization in January 1960, its top bureaucrats became increasingly vocal in their frustration with the regime, and in their advocacy of Kurdish autonomy. A Khabat editorial on 19 May, for example, declared that Iraqi Arabs should ‘recognize the full national rights of the Kurdish people’ in Iraq and ‘bolster the Kurdish movement outside Iraq to enable them to liberate Kurdistan’.Qasim did not respond kindly to such rhetoric. In November 1960, he arrested and tried Ibrahim Ahmad for an article he had written in Khabat that October. The KDP Secretary-General had dared question the idea that Iraq formed part of the ‘Arab Nation’, as the Interim Constitution stated. The Iraqi republic, Ahmad reminded his readers, included ‘Arabs, Kurds, and other national minorities’, and therefore could not be considered part of a homogenous ‘Arab nation’. A permanent constitution, he argued, should include language which better reflected the country’s demographic realities.A Khabat editorial on 19 May, for example, declared that Iraqi Arabs should ‘recognize the full national rights of the Kurdish people’ in Iraq and ‘bolster the Kurdish movement outside Iraq to enable them to liberate Kurdistan’.Qasim did not respond kindly to such rhetoric. In November 1960, he arrested and tried Ibrahim Ahmad for an article he had written in Khabat that October. The KDP Secretary-General had dared question the idea that Iraq formed part of the ‘Arab Nation’, as the Interim Constitution stated. The Iraqi republic, Ahmad reminded his readers, included ‘Arabs, Kurds, and other national minorities’, and therefore could not be considered part of a homogenous ‘Arab nation’. A permanent constitution, he argued, should include language which better reflected the country’s demographic realities.Qasim did not respond kindly to such rhetoric. In November 1960, he arrested and tried Ibrahim Ahmad for an article he had written in Khabat that October. The KDP Secretary-General had dared question the idea that Iraq formed part of the ‘Arab Nation’, as the Interim Constitution stated. The Iraqi republic, Ahmad reminded his readers, included ‘Arabs, Kurds, and other national minorities’, and therefore could not be considered part of a homogenous ‘Arab nation’. A permanent constitution, he argued, should include language which better reflected the country’s demographic realities.

Ahmad received an acquittal, but additional confrontations followed. On 17 February, the pro-government newspaper al-Thawra published an article calling for the ‘fusion’ of Iraqi Kurds with the country’s Arab majority. All sectors of Kurdish society responded furiously. Even leaders of the Jaf and Pizhdar tribes joined the KDP in condemning the article. Their protests did not deter Qasim. On 9 March, he issued a warrant for Ibrahim Ahmad’s arrest, implicating him in the murder of Sidiq Miran, a Kurdish landowner and former member of the Chamber of Deputies, well known for his ‘obeisance’ to the Premier. Ahmad fled for the mountains, while public order broke down in the north. Between 5 and 11 March, Kurds and Turkomen clashed once again in Kirkuk, leading to several deaths and the arrests of numerous KDP officials. Kurds in Irbil and Mosul demonstrated against Arab nationalism. In Sulaymaniya, Kurdish nationalists machine-gunned the car of Captain Husayn Shirwani, chief of the local police intelligence branch, and set off bombs elsewhere in the city. Qasim responded by deploying soldiers and policemen throughout northern Iraq, and suspended the publication of Khabat.Qasim did not respond kindly to such rhetoric. In November 1960, he arrested and tried Ibrahim Ahmad for an article he had written in Khabat that October. The KDP Secretary-General had dared question the idea that Iraq formed part of the ‘Arab Nation’, as the Interim Constitution stated. The Iraqi republic, Ahmad reminded his readers, included ‘Arabs, Kurds, and other national minorities’, and therefore could not be considered part of a homogenous ‘Arab nation’. A permanent constitution, he argued, should include language which better reflected the country’s demographic realities.Qasim did not respond kindly to such rhetoric. In November 1960, he arrested and tried Ibrahim Ahmad for an article he had written in Khabat that October. The KDP Secretary-General had dared question the idea that Iraq formed part of the ‘Arab Nation’, as the Interim Constitution stated. The Iraqi republic, Ahmad reminded his readers, included ‘Arabs, Kurds, and other national minorities’, and therefore could not be considered part of a homogenous ‘Arab nation’. A permanent constitution, he argued, should include language which better reflected the country’s demographic realities.

By early April, the Iraqi army and police restored a precarious calm to the Kurdish region, but it did not last long. Inter-tribal clashes resumed between the Barzanis and the Zibaris, Harkis, and Surchis, as well as followers of Sidiq Miran. The police continued to arrest KDP officials. The party’s branches in Kirkuk and Mosul were shut down. Early in May, Qasim held a widely publicized meeting with the leaders of the Zibari tribe and their allies, deliberately timed to coincide with the KDP’s annual congress. The party responded in kind. On 15 May, it sent Qasim a 34-page memorandum detailing their grievances against the central government, ending it with 13 demands. Only one dealt with ‘ending the oppressive and biased policy toward Kurdish nationalism’. The other 12 demands attacked Qasim on grounds familiar to the Iraqi public at large, calling for the end of military rule, the release of detainees, the drafting of a permanent constitution, liberalizing the rules of political party activity, and better economic planning.
seems to have ignored the document entirely. By the end of the month, the Turkish government had relocated numerous Kurdish villagers from its south-eastern frontier, in anticipation of civil war in Iraq.\textsuperscript{60} Despite growing hostility between the regime and the KDP, it is unlikely that a unified, armed Kurdish separatist movement had crystallized by the summer of 1961. The KDP might have grown more vocal in its advocacy of autonomy, and increasingly at odds with Qasim. Yet effective power in Iraqi Kurdistan did not lie with the party’s urban intellectuals and professionals, but with the Barzani tribe and its rivals. While the Barzanis were functionally allied with the KDP, it is hard to believe that they sought a separate Iraqi Kurdistan - an assertion stated as fact in Arab nationalist sources.\textsuperscript{61} For example, in mid-June, Mulla Mustafa sent Shaykh Ahmad Barzani to Baghdad to meet with Qasim, apparently at the latter’s invitation. There, the elder Barzani pledged his family’s loyalty to the Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{62} Shaykh Ahmad’s mission mirrored those of the Baradost and Harki aghas in the autumn of 1959, and of the Arab Shammar tribe following the Mosul revolt. It indicates the extent to which the Barzanis’ disputes with Qasim remained embedded within a long-standing pattern of state-tribe relations, and complicates Mulla Mustafa’s image as a separatist nationalist. Furthermore, the Barzanis made only a limited effort to stockpile arms during the winter and spring of 1961.\textsuperscript{63} A protracted struggle for independence would have required far more weapons, money, and foreign backing than Barzani possessed at the time. At most, Mulla Mustafa sought Kurdish autonomy. This might have meant no more to him than protection from his enemies, and the reinstatement of the privileges he had previously enjoyed.

Yet Qasim, the Barazanis, and the KDP all lacked faith in the idea that their disputes might be solved through sanctioned political channels. Qasim and Mulla Mustafa did not attempt to mediate their dispute through state institutions. Barzani sought help from abroad, courted other tribal leaders, and made private appeals to the Premier. Qasim withheld patronage and delegated the duty of violent coercion to Barzani’s tribal rivals. The KDP lacked any means to pursue its aims besides direct approaches to Qasim and print propaganda. Qasim responded with obfuscation, arrests and censorship, which were met with violent protest. No dispute between any of the parties was arbitrated within a court or a legislative body. When they failed to reconcile their competing interests, no institutional restraints kept them from using violence.

In the early summer of 1961, Qasim attempted to solidify his position by projecting his power outward, toward the newly independent state of Kuwait. Ongoing violence in Iraqi Kurdistan helped undermine this endeavour, revealing the strategic consequences of the Iraqi state’s weakness. The Premier attempted to save face through pacification, and pushed Iraq into civil war in the process.

On 25 June 1961, less than a week after Kuwait received its independence from Britain, Qasim claimed it as a part of Iraq’s Basra liwa. Originally, it seems that Qasim had planned to invade Kuwait that July, following an Iraqi-backed coup, before Shaykh ‘Abdallah Salim al-Sabah concluded a treaty with Britain. When al-Sabah and the British reached an agreement on 19 June, they undermined the Iraqi leader’s plan, but he moved forward haphazardly
anyway. British and Saudi troops landed in Kuwait on 1 July, while the Arab League debated how to resolve the crisis. Qasim continued to repeat his claims, while the governments of Saudi Arabia and the UAR rallied other Arab states against Iraq. On 20 July, the Arab League Council admitted Kuwait as a member, ordered Iraq not to use force against it, and called for the withdrawal of British troops from the shaykhdom. The League also organized a small, multi-national Arab force to safeguard Kuwaiti independence. British troops left that October, and the crisis dissipated without bloodshed. Its ramifications were felt, however, within Iraq itself.

In mid-July, at the peak of the Kuwait crisis, the Barzanis went on the offensive, burning Zibari and Rikani villages. The Iraqi government lost control over much of northern Iraq. Thousands of Kurds fled for Iran, Turkey, and the Iraqi interior. By the end of July, Qasim had dispatched army reinforcements to the Aqra garrison to reassert the state’s authority over Iraqi Kurdistan. By that time, however, the fighting had done Qasim considerable damage. The Barzanis had called his sovereignty into question at the very moment of his bid for regional leadership, and forced him to divert troops which might have been placed along the Kuwaiti border. Moreover, his tribal allies had been defeated. The fighting had revealed the Barzanis, particularly Mulla Mustafa’s Soviet-trained fighters, to be tougher and more unified than their enemies. Only the Zibari tribe consistently opposed Mulla Mustafa’s forces. Other tribes entered and left the anti-Barzani coalition as they wished, giving Mulla Mustafa and his followers a decisive advantage.

Between late July and September, Qasim did his best to pacify Iraqi Kurdistan. Over the course of August, Iraqi army units moved out of Aqra toward the Greater Zab River, the dividing line between Zibari and Barzani territory. Reconnaissance planes began flying over the Kurdish region on a daily basis. The KDP harshly condemned the troop deployments, accused the Premier of courting ‘civil war’. In fact, Qasim seems to have hoped that his token display of force would deter a second round of intra-Kurdish fighting. According to Iraq’s Deputy Foreign Minister, the Premier viewed the tribal disturbances as the product of foreign plotting, a deliberate diversion from his designs on Kuwait. Even in mid-September, after the revolt had begun, he reportedly told one confidante: ‘They want me to send my army to the North to weaken my defenses elsewhere. I shall not do it. I shall use [airplanes].’ The KDP’s leaders understood the Premier’s dilemma, and sought to play the Kuwait card against him. In one statement, the party attacked the government for ‘turning its back on imperialism’ by moving troops from southern to northern Iraq.

Meanwhile, a separate series of disturbances erupted in southern Kurdistan. In June 1961, a coalition of southern Kurdish tribal leaders approached Qasim in Baghdad, and asked him to repeal a new land tax and other agrarian reform measures. The Premier refused. In July and August, the same tribal leaders, concentrated in the Sulaymaniya-Penjwin area, took advantage of Barzani-Zibari fighting to rebel against government efforts at crop collection. Tribal fighters seized control of several districts and major roads. By the beginning of September, Mulla Mustafa reigned supreme in almost all of northern Iraqi Kurdistan. In the south, a loose coalition of anti-Qasim tribes held sway, led by Abbas Mamand of the Aku tribe, who maintained close contacts with Mulla Mustafa. Tribal squabbles, remarked the British ambassador, had ‘developed into something approaching a Kurdish rising against government authority’.
By 10 September, Qasim lost patience, and Iraq's air force began bombing Kurdish towns and villages. Whole villages were levelled by bombs and rockets. Civilians were killed indiscriminately alongside tribal fighters. A few days later, the Iraqi army went into action in southern Kurdistan, forcing Kurdish tribesmen out of the Derbendi Khan area. Local supporters of the ICP guided the soldiers in their hunt for the ‘reactionary’ supporters of Abbas Mamand. Airplanes bombed Barzan village, incinerating the home of Mulla Mustafa.

On 23 September, Qasim announced that the revolt had been ‘crushed’, and charged the British and American governments with backing it. The Premier officially banned the KDP on 26 September, accusing its leaders of being in British pay. At the same time, since Qasim had supposedly suppressed the revolt, he struck a conciliatory pose. Government statements promised that Mosul would receive 345,000 dinars for its power grid, that new elementary schools would open in Kirkuk, and that a canning factory would be built in Sulaymaniya, among other pledges. The Kurdish rebels, however, remained undefeated and unconvincing. Over the next year and a half, they continued to undermine Qasim, playing a key role in the Premier’s ultimate downfall and demise. The first phase of the revolt lasted until the end of October 1961. Barzani and Abbas Mamand’s followers consolidated their hold on the mountainous areas along the Turkish and Iranian borders, ensuring that the army would not attack them until the winter snows melted. The Iraqi army, assisted by Zibari, Surchi, Baradost and Harki tribesman, held much of the low-lying, populous interior of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Throughout the winter, the two sides remained locked in a stalemate. Periodic skirmishing, however, continued, reaching particularly vicious heights in the heavily Assyrian Amadiya-Dahuk area. The area passed from Barzani to Zibari hands earlier that autumn, and the pro-government forces pillaged and destroyed numerous villages. When Mulla Mustafa’s forces returned in December, they accused the Assyrians of treachery. In the village of Kani Masi, Barzani’s men took revenge by killing every male above the age of 15 whom they could capture. By early January, approximately 4,500 Assyrians had fled their homes for other parts of Iraq.

Qasim and the Barzanis maintained periodic contact. The tribesmen wished for a respite from fighting, while Qasim sought to concentrate the army’s efforts on southern Kurdistan, needing relative calm in the north. On 11 December, the Premier granted amnesty to a number of Kurdish prisoners, while issuing an ultimatum a week later to ‘those who are still evading justice after the crushing of the abortive imperialist insurrection’. Those who failed to respond, he warned, would be subject to the ‘strictest disciplinary measures’, but those who surrendered would receive lenient treatment. Apparently, these words were no more than a cunning ruse. In mid-December (the exact date is unclear), Barzani agreed to meet with Iraqi officials to discuss the terms of a settlement. He was delayed in arriving, and his tardiness saved his life. Iraqi air force planes bombed their meeting place before Mulla Mustafa reached it, killing most of his supporters present.

Negotiations continued thereafter, but it was clear that both sides simply sought to buy time before the next major round of fighting. Barzani demanded a number of conditions from the Premier, including re-legalizing the KDP and Khabat, amnesty for the rebels, government support for Kurdish-language education, development projects, and the right for the Kurdish rebels to retain some of their arms. Qasim, refusing to look weak, acceded to none of these
demands. In public, he denied the negotiations, and announced once again that the revolt had ‘finally been put down’. Iraq’s Kurds, he remarked, had no right to delimit the sovereignty of the state themselves. Their liwas belonged to Iraq, not the Kurdish nation, just as ‘Amara, Karbala, Hilla, and Basra all belong to every Iraqi’. Only Shaykh Ahmad Barzani managed to extract small concessions from the Premier by making public pledges of loyalty to Qasim. It is likely that he did so at the urging of his younger brother, in order to prevent additional bombing of Barzan villages and government expropriation of Barzani property.74

Throughout the winter, the rebel coalition’s power grew. The Barzanis confiscated large quantities of small arms from the Iraqi army and police units they defeated, and absorbed Kurdish army deserters into their ranks. Men, arms, and money flowed in from Kurdish communities in Turkey, Iran, and Syria. The Barzani imposed a 10 per cent income tax on the Kurdish villages they controlled, and even extracted contributions from urban Kurds who remained under government rule. In late February, Iraqi policemen arrested wealthy Kurds in Baghdad, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya for providing money to the insurgents. Many formerly apolitical Kurds contributed willingly to the Barzanis, pushed toward the rebel camp by the actions of the Iraqi military. Others did so out of fear. The Barzani treated enemy Kurds with particular hostility, ‘punishing’ villages perceived as pro-government, and killing captured Kurdish policemen and soldiers who refused to join the revolt. The KDP, which remained passive through the autumn, began organizing its own militia in December 1961. Initially, however, Mulla Mustafa and Abbas Mamand sought to limit its involvement in their respective spheres of influence. The party continued to concentrate its efforts in the cities of northern Iraq, distributing print propaganda and organizing anti-regime political activity.75

On 7 March 1962, Qasim offered all Kurdish rebels complete amnesty, as well as government aid to rebuild damaged villages and foster economic development. The Premier had denied the existence of the revolt all winter, and his offer reflected weakness, not strength. The KDP responded with another pamphlet, which described northern Iraq as ‘south Kurdistan’, and called for autonomy ‘as is given to minority peoples in liberated countries such as Switzerland, Yugoslavia, India, and Czechoslovakia’. By the end of March, Mulla Mustafa’s forces had launched a new offensive in the Sulaymaniya and Mosul provinces, forcing Qasim to transfer additional units from southern Iraq northward. Kurdish forces inflicted a number of defeats on the army in the mountains, and threatened government forces in urban areas as well. After dark, the KDP enjoyed virtual control over the streets of Sulaymaniya. Its agents assassinated unfriendly local officials, including the deputy police commander and the qaimaqam. At the beginning of April, the Barzanis occupied all of the high ground around Mosul. Only a lack of armour and heavy weapons prevented them from taking the city.76

Qasim launched a counter-offensive in mid-April, which initially achieved some success. By June 1962, however, the tide of battle shifted in Barzani’s favour once again, when his fighters turned back an army assault in the Penjwin area. The rebel coalition continued to gain sophistication and strength. Through April 1962, the Kurdish insurgents had no unified command structure. Power remained concentrated in the person of Mulla Mustafa on one hand, and in the KDP leadership on the other. By the summer of 1962, this had changed. The various factions of the rebel coalition formed a collective decision-making body, the Revolutionary Council, which included Iraqi, Iranian and Turkish Kurds. This round of fighting also witnessed the crystallization of the KDP’s pesh merga militia, concentrated
in southern Kurdistan, and commanded by Ibrahim Ahmad, Jalal Talabani, and Umar Mustafa. Previously, Mulla Mustafa had refused to allow the KDP to conduct military operations in the mountain areas. His new willingness to cooperate reflected the increasing cohesion of the Kurdish rebel effort. Over the summer of 1962, the pesh merga absorbed numerous deserters from the Iraqi army, increasing their numerical size, their supplies of weaponry and ammunition, and their degree of combat discipline. A series of Kurdish victories in late July and early August forced Qasim to transfer the bulk of the army’s First Division northward. By the end of the month, approximately 40 per cent of the Iraqi army’s combat troops were deployed in northern Iraq. 77

The Kurdish rebels remained conscious of the fact that comprehensive victory on the battlefield would elude them. While their forces proved effective in guerrilla operations in the mountains, they lacked the discipline, manpower, and weapons necessary to move out of Kurdistan or hold urban areas for sustained periods of time. They had no anti-aircraft or anti-tank guns, little motorized transport, no armoured vehicles, and no artillery beyond a handful of mortars. Finances and food remained in short supply. They could wear Qasim down in a war of attrition, but they could not coerce him into negotiations alone. Ultimately, they would require the aid of a foreign patron or other forces within Iraqi society to break the stalemate and achieve their political ends.

To increase their chances of foreign patronage, the Kurdish rebels conducted a propaganda campaign aimed at Western audiences. The KDP issued a general invitation to reporters to visit northern Iraq and meet Mulla Mustafa Barzani. Specific invitations were extended to New York Times, Time-Life, and Associated Press reporters, and to writers for Le Monde, the Daily Telegraph, and other European newspapers. Two reporters, Dana Adams Schmidt of the New York Times and David Adamson of the Daily Telegraph, eventually expanded their coverage of the rebellion into book-length, highly sympathetic treatments of the Kurdish national movement. 78 Schmidt even took it upon himself to convey messages from Barzani to American diplomats. 79 Barzani’s agent abroad, Kamuran Ali Badir Khan, travelled throughout Europe and the United States to promote the Kurdish cause. In the summer of 1962, he spent six weeks visiting the US, meeting with ‘high officials of the State Department, UN functionaries, Senators, Mrs. [Eleanor] Roosevelt, and Justice [William O.] Douglas’, most of whom ‘listened sympathetically and promised to help the Kurdish cause’. 80

Ultimately, the Kurds’ public relations campaign did not change the course of Western policy. Neither American nor British policymakers responded positively to Kurdish requests for material aid or political support. By the summer of 1962, agents of Mulla Mustafa had requested aid from Britain at least twice, and were turned down both times. When the Kurds made similar approaches to the Kuwaiti government, British officials pressured the al-Sabah family to reject them. The United States seems to have received even more Kurdish entreaties. From September 1961 onward, Kurdish emissaries pressed American officials in both Iraq and Washington to provide material and military aid, support the Kurdish cause at the United Nations, and pressure the Iranian government to permit cross-border smuggling.
Some of these requests included conditions which American diplomats could barely believe. In July 1962, for example, one KDP official told an American diplomat that the KDP would purge itself of ‘any persons [American officials] consider suspect, cooperate with conservative Arab Iraqi elements and bring Iraq into Baghdad Pact if [the Americans] wish’. He added that Mulla Mustafa might consider making Iraqi Kurdistan an autonomous province of Iran, America’s ally. The stated American position remained the same. American diplomats told their Kurdish interlocutors that the United States government could not take sides in an Iraqi internal dispute. Any expression of sympathy on its part might be seen as interference. It also needed to consider its relations with Iran and Turkey.81

The Soviet Union remained similarly aloof, despite its past patronage of Mulla Mustafa Barzani. There is some evidence that the USSR provided the KDP with small sums of money, earmarked for individual members of the party known for their pro-communist sympathies. The Soviet government also allowed Iraqi communists to print a few pro-Kurdish articles in the Soviet press. Yet Soviet officials remained unwilling to break with Qasim, despite the Premier’s anti-communist crackdown in 1959. Barzani did not receive whatever he sought during his 1960-61 stay in Moscow. There is no evidence that the USSR provided Barzani or the KDP with material assistance of any importance, while the Iraqi army and air force continued to receive Soviet weaponry, which was used to attack Kurdish villages. Even the Soviet UN delegation refrained from arguing the Kurdish case. In July 1963, it finally pushed for a resolution condemning the Iraqi government’s treatment of the Kurds - six months after Qasim’s fall from power.82

Regional powers did not prove much more helpful to the Kurdish rebels. The Kuwaiti government, as noted earlier, rejected Kurdish approaches in accordance with British wishes. Abd al-Nasser does not seem to have tried to aid the Kurds beyond broadcasting a handful of sympathetic reports on Egyptian radio. One KDP official described Egyptian policy as ‘friendly but unhelpful’.83 The Israeli government took only a slightly more activist approach. Following the outbreak of the revolt, Israeli diplomats and intelligence officers in Paris received requests from Kamuran Ali Badir Khan for weapons, money, medical supplies, and propaganda aid. They provided him with $20,000 to purchase radio equipment, but nothing more. Large-scale Israeli aid to the Kurds only began after Qasim’s ousting in 1963.84

Even the Iranian government, the rebels’ most important potential ally, approached the rebels cautiously. After the Lawlan rebellion and Qasim’s anti-communist turn, Iranian policymakers began to temper their meddling in the affairs of Iraq’s Kurds.85 The Iranian government attempted to preserve its rapprochement with Qasim during the early months of the revolt, but began to waver after the Iraqi army foundered repeatedly on the battlefield. By September 1962, KDP officials confirmed that the Iranian military had begun allowing the rebels to smuggle men, money, and supplies across the border. Nevertheless, the Iranian government does not seem to have supplied or trained the Kurdish rebels at this stage. Once again, Iranian restraint stemmed in part from American pressure. US Secretary of State Dean Rusk gave American diplomats explicit orders to discourage Iranian policymakers from backing the Kurds. Moreover, the Iranian government had to consider the effect of the revolt on its own Kurdish population. In August 1962, Iranian Prime Minister Asadollah Alam revealed that Iran had rejected secret proposals from Barzani which called for incorporating an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan into Iran. The Iranian government, Alam remarked, had no interest in facilitating Kurdish autonomy, which could have a centrifugal effect on the Iranian state. At the same time, however, it could not afford to alienate its own Kurdish citizens by supporting Qasim.86 Hence, until Qasim’s
fall, the Iranian regime continued to aid the Kurdish rebels through benign negligence, but did not adopt a more activist posture.

Limited foreign patronage forced the Kurdish rebels to become adept at self-sufficiency. They faced great obstacles in doing so, particularly a chronic shortage of money. Individual fighters received no pay, only the necessary food, clothing and weapons. Taxes raised by the Revolutionary Council paid for food and arms, and helped support the families of Kurdish fighters and political prisoners. Pro-Barzani landowners gave large shares of their crop yields directly to the Kurdish fighters. Iranian and Turkish Kurds made additional donations of food. These combined efforts allowed the Kurdish rebels to maintain an austere yet stable existence, and strengthened ties between the disparate factions of their coalition. By October 1962, they had grown self-confident enough to attack oil refineries and pipelines. At the Ayn Zala refinery, outside Kirkuk, pesh merge fighters killed several policemen and kidnapped 24 civilians. Mulla Mustafa and the KDP leaders seemed determined to show that their men could fight on the plains as well as the mountains and that they could do damage to the Iraqi economy.

The army responded to the rebels’ successes with increasing brutality. For several weeks, the Iraqi army attempted and failed to capture Penjwin from the rebels, in spite of their advantages in manpower and equipment. Finally, at the end of October, the troops gathered women and children from nearby villages. Iraqi soldiers lashed the children to the fronts of their vehicles, and marched the women ahead of them at gunpoint into the town. The Kurdish rebels, stunned, abandoned Penjwin. The Iraqi military did not typically resort to such dramatic gestures, but their general conduct reflected similar contempt for the welfare of Kurdish civilians. Iraqi troops routinely shot any group of two or more Kurds whom they found outdoors in captured villages. Soldiers systematically looted villages which came under their control. They were particularly concerned to confiscate food, livestock, money, and clothing, to prevent supplies from reaching the rebels and to starve the local population into submission. The Iraqi air force persisted in its indiscriminate, constant bombing of Kurdish villages. In private, KDP officials bitterly remarked that ‘if the British in Rhodesia or the Portugese in Angola were one-tenth as barbaric as Qasim in Kurdistan, Asian and African countries would be clamoring to condemn the “imperialists” at the United Nations’. Unfortunately, it seemed that ‘the murder of an Asian people by other Asians is acceptable in the world today’. There is no evidence, however, that the army’s actions sapped the will of the Kurdish rebels. If anything, its atrocities played a key role in transforming the war from a struggle over the limits of sovereignty to a battle for Kurdish survival. ‘The Kurds have told us for some time’, an American diplomat observed, ‘that they consider Qasim’s war a racial one, and that Qasim is determined to wipe out the Kurdish people.’ Fewer and fewer Kurds proved willing to collaborate with the government, whose intentions seemed increasingly sinister. The numbers of pro-Qasim tribal fighters, derisively called jahsh Karim (Karim’s donkeys) by the rebels, declined precipitously. Many of those who continued to fight for the Premier were unemployed tribesmen who did so for money. By November 1962, only one of the Barzanis’ rival tribes, the Harki, remained largely on the side of the government. Other anti-Barzani tribes, the Zibari, Surchi, and Baradost were divided between supporters of Qasim, rebels, and those who received government stipends to remain neutral. Sometimes, those same stipends made their way into rebel coffers.
By the beginning of November, the KDP felt sure enough of the rebels' position to order all sectors of Kurdish society to abide by strict guidelines. In widely-distributed leaflets, the leaders of the KDP told Iraqi Kurds that they were forbidden to serve in the military or pay Iraqi taxes. They would have to pay taxes to the rebels, and submit ‘all internal disputes…to the partisans for adjudication’. All Kurds were required to back the revolt, either in the field or with material assistance.89 The boldness of these demands underscores the rebels’ increasingly hegemonic position within Kurdish society, and the counterproductive nature of Qasim’s efforts to undermine them.

In contrast to the rebels, the Iraqi military lacked confidence in its mission and battlefield prowess. Qasim, a successful coup-plotter, did not want his officers to follow his example. Hence, the Premier forced numerous officers to retire, and assigned the most talented men who remained to instructional and staff roles. The officers who commanded troops in Kurdistan tended to be poorly trained and inexperienced in combat. Qasim gave them minimal supplies of ammunition and made most important strategic decisions himself. As a consequence, they lacked the ability to take independent initiative in the field.

Ethnic divisions within the army also proved problematic. Prior to 1961, many Kurds had served in the Iraqi army. After numerous Kurdish troops deserted in the early phases of the revolt, Qasim was forced to stop recruiting Kurdish soldiers and to transfer predominantly Kurdish units away from the front. Prior to the outbreak of the revolt, the army’s Second Division, stationed in Kirkuk, was approximately 80 per cent Kurdish. More than two-thirds of those Kurdish soldiers had been transferred to southern Iraq or had deserted by January 1963. Troop transfers and desertions sapped the overall size of the counterinsurgent force and magnified the ethnic dimension of the conflict.

Additionally, the army was plagued by problems of logistics, tactical doctrine and morale. Inter-unit coordination was poor; Kurdish forces frequently isolated and defeated individual companies of troops. Unlike the rebels, the army lacked experience in mountain combat, and their heavy weapons often proved more cumbersome than helpful. New Soviet weapons remained poorly integrated into the pre-existing logistical frameworks and tactical doctrine of infantry and armoured units. The Iraqi air force fared no better, gaining unfamiliar planes while losing experienced pilots to Qasim’s purges. The enlisted infantrymen who endured the worst of the fighting grew increasingly frustrated with their mission. Not only did they suffer from a lack of leadership and motivation, they endured material hardship as well. Since Qasim refused to acknowledge the existence of the revolt, he also refused to grant his soldiers combat pay. Iraqi troops in Kurdistan fought a protracted, dangerous counterinsurgency campaign for the standard ‘field exercise increment’ paid to all troops on manoeuvres.90

Throughout 1962, the military’s unhappiness filtered into Iraqi society at large, mixing with other grievances against Qasim. Arab nationalists attacked him from the right, charging him with using insufficient force against the rebellion. One Ba’th party pamphlet, for example, attacked the Premier for his ‘criminal responsibility for the events in the North’ and his ‘total failure to put an end to the resultant losses in the lives of the officers of our Army, its soldiers, and
hundreds of other people’. Such sentiments ran particularly strong in Mosul. On 21 March 1962, large numbers of the city’s Arabs demonstrated against Qasim, calling on him to take a tougher stand against the Kurdish rebels. 91 Other Iraqis adopted different attitudes. On 22 April 1962, Kamil Chadirji, the leader of the liberal National Democratic Party, gave an interview attacking Qasim for ignoring Kurdish national feeling. He warned his fellow Iraqis that the revolt could not be dismissed as a transient phenomenon, and urged the government to address the question of Kurdish autonomy seriously. In April, the ICP organized demonstrations calling for ‘peace in Kurdistan’; in August, it circulated leaflets advocating the same. Yet Kurdish relations with the communists worsened over the course of the revolt. The conservative aghas in the Kurdish coalition had disliked the ICP in the first place, and vice versa. The KDP resented the fact that they received no material backing from the ICP, while the communists gave their unflagging support to the Soviet Union, which supplied the Iraqi army with its weapons. Many, if not most of the ICP’s Kurdish members deserted the party to join the rebels. 92

Until late 1962, the Kurdish rebel leadership remained convinced that Qasim could offer them more than any other political force in Iraqi society. Contacts between the Premier and the leaders of the KDP resumed in October, mediated by Qasim’s Minister of Housing, Hasan Rifa’t, himself a Kurd. The Kurdish leaders demanded that Qasim withdraw the Iraqi army to its bases, release Kurdish political prisoners, and accept Kurdish autonomy in principle before they would cease hostilities. The Premier did not respond to these proposals, and the army’s actions at Penjwin could not have bolstered Kurdish hopes for rapprochement. By November 1962, the leaders of the Kurdish rebellion seem to have concluded that Qasim’s downfall was imminent. Either the ICP or some combination of Arab nationalist forces would overthrow him. If the Kurds hoped to secure their aims in a post-Qasim Iraq, it would behove them to forge ties with the Premier’s most likely successors. By the time Qasim dispatched Rifa’t with another peace offer that December, such ties had already been forged. In December and January, the Premier released Kurdish prisoners held in Baghdad and Hilla jails. He eased the army’s grip on a handful of towns in the Irbil liwa, and made a final offer of general amnesty to the rebels on 10 January 1963. These small gestures of goodwill came far too late for the Kurds. 93

In November 1962, the leaders of the KDP had approached the heads of the ICP, and proposed a joint Kurdish-communist coup. The communists demurred, and the Kurds chose to align themselves with Ba’thist and Nasserist army officers who had begun to plot against Qasim. Ibrahim Ahmad had begun negotiating with Ba’thist and Nasserist army officers as early as April 1962. By December 1962, the KDP leadership decided to lend their support to an Arab nationalist coup plot. They promised their interlocutors within the Iraqi army that they would not take advantage of the diversion of troops to Baghdad. In exchange, the KDP received ostensible guarantees of Kurdish autonomy in a post-Qasim Iraq. In late December, when Ba’thist students went on strike in Baghdad, Kurdish students apparently took part as well; shouts of ‘Long live Mulla Mustafa!’ were reported at the demonstrations which ensued. From 8 to 10 February 1963, the Arab nationalist officers moved, seizing control of Baghdad, capturing and executing Qasim, and killing an unknown number of communists and regime sympathizers. On 10 February, the KDP officially proclaimed its support for the coup and its desire for a ceasefire. Its rapprochement with Arab nationalism, however, would prove short-lived. 94
The years which followed Qasim's fall were not kind to Iraqis in general, and to Iraqi Kurds in particular. The processes of centralization which began under Qasim were accelerated and transformed, particularly after the Ba'th party began its 35-year reign in 1968. This period witnessed the intrusion of the ruling party and the state into all areas of Iraqi social and political life, and the conversion of a particularly radical variety of Arab nationalism into policymaking rationale. Through the 1980s, Iraq's Kurds remained locked in violent conflict with the state, a conflict interspersed with periods of respite and negotiation, and fought by shifting Kurdish political configurations. In 1987 and 1988, the violence peaked with Saddam Hussein's genocidal Anfal campaign, wherein the Iraqi military killed between 150,000 and 200,000 Kurds, razed more than 4,000 Kurdish villages, and forcibly resettled at least 1.5 million people.95

The nature of Iraqi politics and social life under the Ba'th has made it tempting for some historians of Iraq to view Qasim's era as one of lost opportunity. However, historians should remain cautious of overstating the distinctions between Qasim and his successors. Qasim did not share their ultra-nationalist ideology, nor did he aspire to create the sort of totalitarian party-state which Saddam Hussein perfected. Yet the relationship between Qasim's era and those which followed is characterized by continuity as well as change. These continuities become particularly evident where Iraq's Kurds are concerned.

Like his Ba'thist successors, Qasim sought to consolidate the Iraqi state's various loci of power. His centralizing drive pitted him against the aghas of Iraqi Kurdistan, who owed their power in large part to the relatively decentralized nature of the Iraqi state. But while Qasim worked to undermine the foundations of traditional Kurdish tribal society, he empowered two relatively weak factions - the KDP and the Barzanis. By empowering them, he unintentionally raised their expectations of what was politically possible within the new Iraqi polity. The aims of both the KDP and Mulla Mustafa incorporated the assumption that the Iraqi state would maintain some of its decentralized character. Mulla Mustafa assumed that he could become the new state's most powerful Kurdish tribal leader, able to punish his enemies at will. The KDP assumed that Qasim would grant Iraq's Kurds some form of autonomy. Neither party wished to become mere state functionaries, Qasim's commissars for Kurdish affairs. This, however, was the role which the Premier intended for them, and which the ICP might have further articulated had it acquired real power.

Qasim failed to reconcile his own aims with those of the KDP and the Barzanis. While he worked to centralize the Iraqi state through patronage and coercion, he failed to foster the rule of law or a sense of political community. When disputes eventually arose with the KDP and Mulla Mustafa, he lacked the means or the will to resolve them within an institutional context. The Kurds, for their part, had no faith that anything other than personal intercession or public protest could force the Premier to change his course. In the absence of the rule of law, political disputes were settled through patronage or violence. The Ba'th party would both master and transform these methods of rule, while impressing its own ideals of national identity upon Iraq through force and disinformation.
Qasim, unlike his successors, did not justify his war against the Kurds in the language of ethnic nationalism, but perhaps he did not need to do so. It was enough for him to accuse them of serving Western interests, of regarding their liwas as more Kurdish than Iraqi. The Arif brothers, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein would also accuse the Kurds of undermining the aims of Arabism, but the core charge of dual loyalty remained the same.

**Notes**


6. The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, however, already had representatives on the ground in Iraq, led by Ibrahim Ahmad. Initially, they objected to Barzani’s initiative on grounds that acknowledged the separation between Iraqi and Iranian Kurdistan. However, most of them, including Ahmad himself, eventually joined the Iraqi KDP.


14. Baghdad to Sec. of State, 27 July 1958, United States National Archives (hereafter NA)/Record Group (hereafter RG)59/787.00/7-2758.


16. For Arab and Western reactions to the coup, see Jankowski, pp.142-51; Mufti, pp.107-10. For Turkish and Iranian responses, see Viscount Hood to Foreign Office, 18 July 1958, BNA/PREM/11/2368; Tehran to Sec. of State, 14 July 1958, NA/RG59/787.00/7-1458.

17. Podeh, pp.60-63.


21. For Ahmad’s move toward Arif, see Jawad, pp.45, 70-71.


24. Dann, pp.81-4; Baghdad to Sec. of State, 13 Oct. 1958, NA/RG59/787.00/10-1358.

26. Baghdad to Sec. of State, 7 Oct. 1958, NA/RG59/787.00/10-758; Baghdad to Sec. of State, 13 Oct. 1958; NA/RG59/787.00/10-1358; Baghdad to Sec. of State, 17 Oct. 1958, NA/RG59/787.00/10-1758.


28. See al-Zubaydi, pp.287-8; al-Durra, pp.280-81; Baghdad to Sec. of State, 19 Feb. 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/2-1959; Baghdad to Sec. of State, 21 April 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/4-2159; Basra to State, ‘Return of Repatriated Kurds to Iraq’, 21 April 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/4-2159; Baghdad to State, ‘Government Employment of Barzanis’, 8 June 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/6-859; Baghdad to State, ‘Repatriated Barzanis Appointed to Teaching Positions’, 12 Aug. 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/8-1259; Baghdad to State, ‘Estimate of Kurdish Tribal Position in Present-Day Iraq’, 21 May 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/5-2159.


31. For the actions of the local party branch, see Barzani, p.214. With regard to the summary executions, Batatu’s claim may be true, but it is not unproblematic. The communist eyewitness who made the claim apparently did so in police custody in March 1963, against the backdrop of the Ba’th’s post-coup score-settling with the ICP. He would have had a genuine interest in attributing responsibility for the events at Mosul to the UKDP and Mulla Mustafa. See Batatu, p.888. Western sources which shed light on the Kurdish role in the Mosul events include Baghdad to Sec. of State, 16 March 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/3-1659; Aleppo to Sec. of State, 22 March 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/3-2259; Baghdad to State, ‘Further Report from Mosul’, 8 April 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/4-859.

32. See Baghdad to Sec. of State, 6 April 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/4-659; Baghdad to Sec. of State, 9 April 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/4-959; al-Durra, p.281.

34. Edmonds, ‘The Kurds’.

35. Tabriz to State, ‘Data on the Peshtedar Tribe and Its Recent Migrants to Iran’, 2 Jan. 1959, RG59/787.00/1-259. Peshtedar is the Farsi analogue to the tribe’s Kurdish name.


40. For an analysis of the attitudes of the Iranian political and military elites, see Tehran to Foreign Secretary, 4 Dec. 1958, BNA/FO/371/133083.


43. See, for example, State to Tehran, 16 Jan. 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/1-1659; Foreign Office to Tehran, 28 May 1959, BNA/FO371/140682; Baghdad to Sec. of State, 11 June 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/6-1159; State to Tabriz, 12 March 1960, NA/RG59/787.00/3-1260.
44. Baghdad to State, ‘Prime Minister Opens Lawyers Conference with Major Speech’, 1 Dec. 1958, NA/RG59/787.00/12-158. In fact, the maps predated the Revolution, and had Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s picture superimposed on them. They might have been of Soviet origin.


46. Shaykh Rashid was also referred to as Shaykh Muhammad Rashid.

47. Tabriz to Sec. of State, 24 April 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/4-2459; Baghdad to Sec. of State, 5 May 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/5-559; Tabriz to Sec. of State, 18 May 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/5-1859; Baghdad to Sec. of State, 21 May 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/5-2159; Baghdad to State, ‘Estimate of Kurdish Tribal Position in Present-Day Iraq’, 21 May 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/5-2159; Dann, p.199.

48. Tabriz to Sec. of State, 20 June 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/6-2059; Baghdad to Sec. of State, 26 June 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/6-2659; Tabriz to Sec. of State, 22 July 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/7-2259; Ankara to Sec. of State, 29 Aug. 1959, NA/787.00/8-2959; Baghdad to Sec. of State, 19 Sept. 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/9-1959; Tabriz to Sec. of State, 27 Oct. 1959, NA/RG59/787.00/10-2759.

49. al-Durra, p.287.

50. Batatu, pp.891-942 remains the best account of the ebb and flow of the ICP’s fortunes in these critical months.


58. Baghdad to State, ‘Sidiq Miran, Shaqlawa Kurdish Notable Killed’, 28 Feb. 1961, NA/RG59/787.00/2-2861; Baghdad to Sec. of State, 10 March 1961, NA/RG59/787.00/3-1061; Baghdad to State, ‘Khabat Gives Names of Party Members and Others Arrested’, 17 March 1961, NA/RG59/787.00/3-1761; Baghdad to State, 29 March 1961, NA/RG59/787.00/3-2961; Tabriz to State, ‘Kurdish Developments as Seen From Sanandaj’, 29 March 1961, NA/RG59/787.00/3-2861; Baghdad to Sec. of State, 31 March 1961, NA/RG59/787.00/3-3161.

59. Baghdad to Sec. of State, 11 April 1961, NA/RG59/787.00/4-1161; Baghdad to State, ‘Kurdish Party Branches Closed, Arrest of Central Committee Member Ordered’, 18 April 1961, NA/RG59/787.00/4-1861; Baghdad to State, ‘Kurdish Tribesmen Call on the Leader’, 9 May 1961, NA/RG59/787.00/5-961; Baghdad to State, ‘Kurdish Democratic Party Memorandum to Qasim’ and enclosure, 18 May 1961 NA/RG59/787.00/5-1861.

60. Baghdad to State, ‘Turkish Government Reported Moving Kurds Away From Iraq's Border’, 31 May 1961, NA/RG59/787.00/5-3161. Evacuations continued into the summer of 1961; see Baghdad to Sec. of State, 28 July 1961, NA/RG59/787.00/7-2861.

61. See al-Durra, p.285, where the author states that Barzani envisioned ‘a Kurdish state which he would rule, extending to all of the areas of the north in Iraq, and compounded by Kurdish areas not in Iraq’.


63. Some Iranian intelligence officials and anti-Barzani Kurds claimed, on a few separate occasions, that the UAR supplied Mulla Mustafa with arms, using Syrian Kurds as intermediaries. See, for example, Tabriz to State, ‘Kurdish Developments as Seen From Sanandaj’, 29 March 1961, NA/RG59/787.00/2-2961; and Tabriz to State, ‘Recent
Information Regarding Kurdish Developments in Iraq, 9 May 1961, NA/RG59/787.00/5-961. However, such smuggling might have been undertaken by BNAfit-seeking Syrians, rather than Nasser’s agents. In any case, it accounted for fairly few weapons; the Barzanis had only 2,000 rifles and a few mortars as of August 1961. Mas’ud Barzani writes that ‘Barzani inferred that Qasim’s doubts were irreversible’, and that he and the KDP had already begun to coordinate their military preparations. This claim, however, is not borne out by the actual events of the revolt; the KDP did not join in armed actions until December 1961, and Mulla Mustafa sought to limit its sphere of operation as much as possible until mid-1962. Barzani also fails to mention Mulla Mustafa’s offensive against his tribal rivals in the summer of 1961, which seems to have been Qasim’s real reason for choosing war. See Barzani, pp.231-2.


71. Tabriz to Sec. of State, 19 Oct. 1961, NA/RG59/787.00/10-161; Tabriz to Secretary of State, 25 Oct. 1961, NA/RG59/787.00/10-2561; Tabriz to Sec. of State, 1 Nov. 1961, NA/RG59/787.00/10-161.


75. Tabriz to State, ‘The Kurdish Revolt in Iraq as Seen from Mahabad’, 18 Jan. 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/1-1862; Baghdad to Foreign Office, 14 Feb. 1962, BNA/FO/371/164232; Baghdad to State, ‘Further Reports of Increased Kurdish Rebel Activity’, 28 Feb. 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/2-2862; Baghdad to Sec. of State, 3 March 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/3-362; Baghdad to State, ‘Recent Kurdish Pamphlets Attacking Qasim’, 29 March 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/3-2962.

76. Baghdad to State, ‘Qasim’s Offer of Amnesty to Kurds’, 15 March 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/3-1562; Basra to State, ‘Echoes of the Kurdish Revolt in Basra’, 9 April 1962 NA/787.00/4-962; Baghdad to State, 13 April 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/4-1362.


79. Beirut to Sec. of State, 5 Sept. 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/9-562.

81. Baghdad to Sec. of State, 29 Sept. 1961, NA/RG59/787.00/9-2961; Department of State, memorandum of conversation, ‘Kurdish Appeal for U.S. Support’, 20 June 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/6-2062; Baghdad to State, ‘Status of Kurdish Revolt as Seen From Baghdad’, 21 July 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/7-2162; London to Sec. of State, ‘Discussion with UK on Kurdish Problem’, 18 Aug. 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/8-1862; Baghdad to Sec. of State, 20 Sept. 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/9-2062.


83. Baghdad to Sec. of State, 20 Sept. 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/9-2062; for pro-Kurdish broadcasts, see O’Ballance, p.80.


86. Rusk to Embassies, 24 May 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/5-2462; Tehran to Sec. of State, 2 Aug. 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/8-262; Baghdad to Sec. of State, 20 Sept. 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/9-2062


88. Baghdad to State, ‘Iraqi Army Wins Battle of Penjwin; Kurdish Unity Strengthened’, 6 Nov. 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/11-662; Baghdad to State, ‘Kurdish Revolt’, 13 Nov. 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/11-1362; Baghdad to Sec. of State, 21 Nov. 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/11-2162.

89. Baghdad to Sec. of State, 2 Nov. 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/11-2622; Baghdad to State, ‘Iraqi Army Wins Battle of Penjwin; Kurdish Unity Strengthened’, 6 Nov. 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/11-662; Baghdad to State, ‘Kurdish Revolt’, 13 Nov. 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/11-1362.

91. Baghdad to State, ‘Kurdish Revolt Reportedly Increases in Intensity, Qasim Offers Kurds “Last Chance”, Kurdish Propaganda Attacks Qasim’, 3 April 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/4-362; Ba’th party pamphlet can be found in BNA/FO/371/164238.


93. Baghdad to Sec. of State, 10 Oct. 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/10-1062; Baghdad to Sec. of State, 18 Dec. 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/12-1862; Baghdad to Sec. of State, 26 Dec. 1962, NA/RG59/787.00/12-2662; Baghdad to State, ‘Offer of Amnesty to Kurds’, 15 Jan. 1963, RG59/787.00/1-1563.

94. Batatu, pp.971-2; Jawad, pp.108-10; McDowall, p.313, Baghdad to Sec. of State, 17 Jan. 1963, NA/RG59/787.00/1-1763.

95. McDowall, pp.359-60.

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