



KURDICA

JOURNAL OF KURDISH AFFAIRS

JULY 1968

KURDICA PUBLICATIONS:

- 1- On the Kurdish Question. Presented to Bureau of Socialist International. August, 1967.
- 2- KURDISH STUDIES - Part One by Col. Taufiq Wahby
Contents: WHO ARE THE KURDS?
A PREMATURE SUMMARY
THE PROTO INDO-IRANIAN PASSIVE PARTICLE '-YA-' IN KURDISH
IS KARDU NOT A PROGENITOR OF THE NAME ' KURD ' ?
THE ETYMOLOGY OF THE KURDISH WORD ' SEPLOT '
THE THREE KOSTAS
- 3- An Appeal Concerning the Tragic Condition of the Kurdish people in Syria.
- 4- CAK's Comment on the Closing of the newspaper Al-Taakhi, plus all the relevant Documents (in Arabic).

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Why KURDICA ?

This first issue of *Kurdica* will, the editorial hopes, show in a very modest way the purpose behind the publication of a journal in English dealing with Kurdish affairs. *Kurdica* is the outcome of an attempt by the Committee for the Advancement of Kurdistan - U.K. to fill a significant gap, namely the absence of a regular journal in Europe primarily concerned with Kurds and Kurdistan. Not unnaturally, politics feature prominently in *Kurdica*, for the simple reason that the daily lives of citizens of Kurdistan hinge so closely upon political events and developments. Yet the journal will not be exclusively political. It is envisaged that considerable attention will be paid to various facets of Kurdish culture - language, history, geography and literature. Unfortunately these areas of study have been grossly neglected and suffered severely as a result of political oppression experienced by people of Kurdistan. No government at the moment is giving even a modicum of opportunity to the Kurds in their endeavour to exercise their natural cultural rights, let alone political civil rights.

Kurdica, however, cannot be a genuine substitute for exercising these elementary and essential rights recognised by the Declaration of Human Rights. These Rights have been persistently ignored and trampled upon by the governments ruling over Kurdistan. We intend to convey this grave situation to

world opinion, particularly to European opinion, in the hope of removing the unjust anomalous circumstances under which the Kurdish nation lives.

Whether we shall succeed in our efforts to achieve the iterated aims will depend partly upon our readers' response to and participation in various sections appearing in *Kurdica*. We hope to develop this journal into a forum for stimulating discussion of Kurds and Kurdistan. We offer the governments at present ruling over Kurdistan an opportunity - which they deny us so harshly at home - to express their views regarding the Kurdish problem, no matter how pernicious these views may be from our viewpoint.

Starting from the next issue, a letter column will be appearing regularly in the magazine to reflect our readers' opinions and reactions (angry or otherwise). So please keep your literate pens writing!

Editor



Comment

TWO YEARS AFTER

It is now two years since the conclusion of the cease-fire agreement between the Kurdish revolutionary forces of Pesh Merga and the Iraqi Government on 29th June, 1966. It is an opportune moment, therefore, for a general review of political events and developments in Kurdistan and Iraq in order to see if any progress has been made in the past two years in the efforts towards finding a long-term solution for the Kurdish problem.

The 29 June 1966 cease-fire was the third agreement of its kind since the beginning of the Kurdish revolution in 1961. It was the inevitable culmination of the unsuccessful nature of the Iraq Army's offensive against Kurdistan launched on April 3rd 1965. Indeed, the Iraqi Army not only failed to crush Kurdish resistance by brute force, but its military campaign floundered disastrously. For during the winter of 1965-1966, the Iraqi Army suffered heavy military defeats at the hands of the partisans of Pesh Merga in strategic areas of Kurdistan, particularly in Penjwin and Rawanduz regions. The turning point in the military confrontation occurred on May 11-12 when two Government battalions were encircled and eventually forced to surrender. This battle - known as the Battle of Hlandreen - has attained legendary stature throughout Kurdistan.

This military background to the cease-fire is necessary to

understand the Plan announced on 29th June 1966. The Plan was the direct result of the military setbacks of the Iraqi army and did not come about as a consequence of an intellectual conversion of the Iraqi rulers. As late as May of that year, Arif II was declaring that 'No autonomy will ever be granted to the Kurds ... The Government has never envisaged negotiations with rebels. It does not intend either to envisage a cease-fire agreement'. Yet only a month later he personally endorsed the agreement. And the 29 June Plan thus emerged.

The Plan comprised fifteen points, twelve of which were announced publicly and three of which have remained undeclared.

The twelve points were:

1. The Iraqi Government recognises Kurdish nationality in an amended provisional constitution and shall incorporate this principle in the permanent constitution, whereby Arabs and Kurds will enjoy equal rights and duties.
2. The Government is ready to express the above principle in the Law of the Provinces to be promulgated on a decentralised basis.
3. The Government recognises Kurdish language as an official language in addition to Arabic in regions whose inhabitants are predominantly Kurdish. Education will be in both languages.

4. The Government intends to hold parliamentary elections within the period stipulated by the provisional constitution. The Kurds will be represented in the next national assembly by a percentage proportional to their ratio of the total population.

5. The Kurds will share with Arabs all public posts in proportion to their population - in ministries, public organisations and in judicial, diplomatic and military posts.

6. A number of scholarships, fellowships and research grants in all fields will be available for Kurdish students. Baghdad University will give special attention to the study of Kurdish language, literature, ideology and history.

7. Government officials in the Kurdish regions will be Kurds.

8. Parliamentary life will be accompanied by the establishment of certain political organisations. Kurds will be allowed to have their own political press in Kurdish as well as other forms of publications.

9. (a) A general amnesty will be granted to all those who participated in the Kurdish revolution.

(b) The Government will facilitate the return of all dismissed Kurdish workers to their previous employment.

(c) All Kurdish officials and employees will be able to return to their previous posts.

10. Members of the armed forces will return to their units.

11. Funds previously spent on

fighting the revolution will be diverted for the purpose of reconstructing the region. A special organisation will be formed to reconstruct the Kurdish area: necessary funds will be allocated for this purpose. A special Ministry will supervise the co-ordination of the various affairs in the area. The Government will compensate all those who had suffered damage during the fighting.

12. The Government will resettle all individuals and groups who had left or been evacuated from their own regions.

The remaining three points were:

1. The province of Dihok will be established to include all Kurdish territories which are at present under Mosul Province administration. Dihok will be a Kurdish administrative unit.

2. The Government will release all political prisoners in Iraq.

3. The Kurdistan Democratic Party shall be allowed to operate openly.

A glance at the terms of the Plan show that they did not tackle the root cause of the Kurdish problem. The Plan did not embrace the basic demand of the revolution, i.e. autonomy for Kurdistan. Nor were any guarantees given that the terms would be implemented. In spite of its glaring shortcomings the Kurdish leadership accepted the Plan as a starting point for a new approach to solving the problem. The Plan, from a Kurdish point of view, constituted a good opportunity for taking the conflict from

the battlefield to the conference room and the negotiating table: the objective of the Kurds has always been a political settlement of the cruel and costly and ugly war in Kurdistan. Then all hopes were pinned on a speedy implementation of the Plan in order to show concrete evidence of the Government's good intentions. It was not so much the actual terms of the Plan which led to rising expectations on the part of the Kurds but the elaborate and public pledges given by Bazzaz that this time the Government was genuine in its desire to reach a durable settlement.

Unfortunately, the Plan has gone into deep-freeze ever since its announcement. The man who had initiated the agreement from the Iraqi side - Bazzaz - was soon ousted from power by the military junta. Five more governments - the latest headed by Tahir Yahya - have followed since 29 June 1966 and all have paid lip service to the terms of the Plan. But nothing has been done in practice towards implementing the modest terms of the agreement. The Government has failed to amend the provisional constitution to express the idea of equal status for Kurds and Arabs within Iraq. On the contrary, the Iraqi constitution still contains an article which is absolutely repugnant to every Kurdish citizen, i.e. Article One, which proclaims 'that the Iraqi people are a constituent part of the great Arab nation'. This Article will either have to be abolished entirely, or must be amended in a way to give the meaning that it only covers the Arab Iraq, and not Kurdistan. No nation in this age of national liberation

and freedom can accept to be swallowed by a completely alien nation by a mere stroke of a pen. This sort of crude attempt at imperialism clearly cannot do the Arabs but harm internationally. The Kurds have demonstrated to the world, in their eventful history, that they will never submit to attempts at assimilation by other nations. It seems paradoxical that the Iraqi Government has meekly recognised and accepted the complete independence of a region like Kuwait, which has been historically and geographically linked with Iraq, and whose inhabitants are Arabs, while it stubbornly rejects the demands of the Kurds - an entirely different nation, and whose country, Kurdistan, constitutes a separate historical and geographical entity, for autonomy. Surely, from a moral and political point of view, there is a much stronger case to be made for unity among members of the same nation than an artificial and imposed union between two different nations.

The Government has ignored the other terms of the agreement. Parliamentary elections have become the mirage of Iraqi politics. Every single ruler since Kassim has promised to hold elections "in near future" but none of them has fulfilled his vow so far. It is quite evident that the military oligarchy considers itself (for nobody else does) a superior form of elite who do not need the consent of the populace. Their rule is a rule by decree and has no room for consultation. The Government is a coalition of paranoid military careerists and opportunists. The military in Iraq have formed an

economic class unto themselves which exploits the wealth of the country. In 1958, people thought that the change of regime would bring close together the rulers and the ruled. In fact nothing of the sort has happened: only an Arif dynasty has replaced a Hashemite one; and the Iraqi officers have become the new feudalist sheikhs. Further, Kurdish representation in public posts is still non-existent. The most bizarre action by the Iraqi Government has been its display of a few characters - whose great-great-grandparents may have been Kurdish - as Ministers representing the Kurdish people in the Government. In fact they are not even remotely connected with the Kurdish movement.

The Government had not fulfilled its pledge to facilitate the return of the Kurdish workers who were victimised because of the Kurdish revolution. This applies in particular to workers in the oil industry, where Kurdish workers are discriminated against. Funds which were supposed to be channelled towards reconstructing and developing Kurdistan are casually distributed to recruit mercenary forces - Jash - to oppose Pesh Merga. Arab tribes remain in villages where they were put when the Kurdish inhabitants were driven out by the Iraqi Army. And what about villages bulldozed out of existence - or the Kurdish quarter in Kirkuk and its former inhabitants?

The inevitable conclusion any observer would draw from the absence of real progress regarding the 29 June Plan is that the Iraqi Government is not willing to put

into practice what it promised to do. It is not the first time that the Iraqi regime fails to fulfil its promises to the Kurds. It has been its standard practice in the past to give many promises in order to alleviate a particular situation and these have been dishonoured the moment the crisis has passed. The Kurdish movement must draw its own conclusions from the experience of the last two years, because it cannot wait indefinitely for the fulfilment of a plan whose originators show no desire of achieving. Therefore the task of taking the necessary steps in order to safeguard the rights and interests of the Kurdish nation falls upon the Kurdish leaders' shoulders. Unfortunately, the Kurdish leaders have sometimes shown political naivety in their dealings with the Iraqi leaders. There is a need to keep the strategy for the Kurdish movement always in sight. The Kurdish leadership ought to set out the essential political goals quite explicitly and define the necessary measures to achieve them.

The Kurdish movement needs strengthening both politically and militarily. An outline of the leaders' intentions is necessary in order to reassure the people of Kurdistan that, regardless of what the Iraqi Government thinks, measures will be taken to achieve and exercise the right of autonomy. The movement for Kurdish autonomy is absolutely irreversible after the considerable sacrifice and struggle of the last seven years. In fact, a de facto autonomous situation already exists throughout most parts of Kurdistan. First of all, there is a regular Kurdish Army

exercising control of a big territory and enjoying the overwhelming support of the population. Taxation, judiciary, local administration and other day-to-day matters are all organised by the Kurdish Revolutionary movement. The Kurds should not hesitate to publicise this fact. It is futile to go on negotiating with a government which has not the slightest intention of accepting a just solution for the Kurdish problem.

A declaration of political goals will further be beneficial in preventing Government exploitation of certain internal differences within the Kurdish movement for its own purposes. Differences in a revolutionare movement are not all

that rare. In fact, it can be argued that they strengthen a movement in the long run. However, in the case of Kurdistan the guiding line for participants in the Kurdish movement must be the overall framework of the Kurdish Revolution. What is at stake is more than an ordinary political and economic issue: it is the survival and integrity of the Kurdish nation. The Kurdish people will never forgive those who might try to play dubious politics with the future of the nation. A closing of the ranks at this juncture is essential. The Iraqi Army may soon launch yet another offensive against Kurdistan. The Kurds must take up and act upon the slogan of the Irish patriots: Sinn Fein (ourselves alone).



SHAQLAWA — KURDISTAN

Arab belt needs tightening

- SYRIAN MINISTER

Our correspondent from Damascus writes: A prominent member of the Baath party in Syria has recently published a book, under the title "A Study of the Jazirah Region". The author is Muhammad Talab Hilal, Minister of Supply in the Syrian Government. The book expounds the author's prescriptions for the assimilation of the Kurdish people in Syria and the means by which the Government can destroy Kurdish national sentiments. Extracts from this book will illustrate and expose the fascist nature of the Syrian regime. Indeed, the policies of the Syrian junta are no less racist than the policies of governments like those of South Africa and Rhodesia.

The author devotes the second part of his book to the Kurdish problem in Syria; there are proposals on pp. 45-48 on how to deal with it, such as:

1. The Government should adopt a policy of shifting population to conform with its "Arab policy".
2. The policy of not establishing any schools or institutes in the Jazirah area, for "experience has shown that the policy of educating them does not necessarily mean Arabising them".
3. Correcting and investigating the civil records to ensure that nationality is gained only through a government decree.
4. Discouraging the Kurds from being employed in the area, so that

"they are mobile enough to be shifted elsewhere".

5. Launching a campaign among the Arab population to explain government policy.

6. Stripping the religious titles and powers from the Kurdish Shaikhs and replacing them with "pure Arab ones" instead.

7. To create political and social dissension among Kurdish families.

8. The housing of Arab elements in the Kurdish area, as they will serve as watchdogs until the Kurds depart.

9. Making the Northern Belt of Jazirah a military area, where troops are stationed whose duty will be the housing of Arabs and supervising the evacuation of the Kurds according to a prearranged plan.

10. Establishing co-operative farms for the new Arab inhabitants, who should undergo military training "exactly like the Jewish settlements on the frontier".

11. Not allowing anyone who does not speak Arabic voting and nomination rights during elections.

12. Banning the granting of Syrian nationality to anyone who wishes to reside in the Jazirah area, no matter what his original nationality was (except Arabic).



The Kurds in 1968

BY A. M. HAMILTON

WHAT LIES AHEAD?

The question both for the Kurds themselves and those interested in this truly remarkable people is what lies ahead for them now. The first phase, that of declaring their existence in the heart of the Middle East, has been established. It has been established by the bravery of the people and the determination of the leaders and scholars both within Kurdistan and out of it. Of these, and amongst some other devoted people, the outstanding personality has undoubtedly been Mulla Mustafa Barzani. His is a name that is almost without parallel in the skill and endurance he has shown and the way he has united his people as soldier and wise leader.

NEIGHBOURS AND WORLD OPINION

Now many writers in many languages have taken up the case for the Kurds and many world powers have become interested in helping, in stifling or in trying to absorb the Kurds into themselves as national interests may dictate. Such neighbours as the Turks may say, and also truly believe, that the Kurds do not exist; for all those within their frontiers possess the rights of Turks and are therefore Turks, not Kurds. The Iranians say that all Kurds are and always were Iranians, speaking the same language as themselves except for a dialect

they choose to call a Kurdish language. The Russians say they are such an interesting emergent people (and potentially usable) that they are clearly a branch of the USSR Kurds. The Arabs of the more nationalistic leanings in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere seem to view the Kurds - when they refuse to be "Arabs" - with hostility and fear and a desire to exterminate them, using all the means their weapons and wealth can provide. Europe and the USA look on the Kurds benignly. Both in England and in France the selling of arms to Iraq, if to be used against the Kurds, has been questioned. The beautiful mountainous country they live in and the old traditions they try to preserve have an appeal to all race-conscious people. Europe's tourist agencies would like to direct their holiday clients there. Her businessmen would like to trade European services and goods for the Middle East petrol their cars consume - hoping the Kurds would have more of a voice in this bartering than the Arabs, nominal owners of the wells and pipe lines whether in Kurdish territories or not, would ever want them to. It is fair at this point, however, to say that there are Arabs and Arabs. The Shia and southern Arabs have no resentment towards their Kurdish neighbours in the North and would only wish to go their ways in peace as, by and large, they have always done.

WHO ARE THE ENEMIES?

Who then are the Kurds' enemies in 1968 and who will be their chief enemies in the future? This article is to be factual or it is not worth writing. For a long time there was a religious tussle in the Mosul Waliyat and north of it between the Christian Assyrians and the Mahomedan Kurds. Both were mountain people, both formidable, both respected and similar in appearance, in dress, in customs. Now the Assyrians, as the result of clever Arab tactics, are away from the mountains except for those remaining there, who have become allies of the Kurds. So Kurd versus Assyrian is at an end. They have the common bond of both being underprivileged.

Regarding the other neighbours of the Kurds, the Mosul people generally known as Mosulawis, though of similar religion (Sunni Mahomedan) are still the Kurds' sworn enemies. I believe they could win them to their side just as they have done the Assyrians. But before the Kurds can even begin to do this effectively they have a greater difficulty to overcome, to make peace among themselves, within their own domains.

THE DIFFICULTIES

From time immemorial there have been bitter tribal Kurdish rivalries and blood feuds (some described in my book "Road through Kurdistan"), and knowing this weakness all their neighbours have just played off some Kurdish tribes against others, or individual Kurds against other Kurds. Thus even a

Mulla Mustapha has his problems, often made for him by his own people or ancient rivals. Whether the Iraqi Army or Air Force will dare to attack again view of the highly unfavourable world opinion of Iraq it would create (apart from the cost and danger of tackling a better armed force than the one that has defied Iraq for 6 years) is questionable. They will first try and buy over those Kurds willing to serve them in official or military positions. Though once so useful, today this has become ineffectual as an appeasement of Kurdish rights and aspirations.

Nearby in Syria, however, strong efforts are being made by the Arab regime in power to literally move the Kurds from the North and starve them of education, of office in the state, and the prosperity and development the Kurdish areas deserve. In strongly worded articles and appeals to the world powers it has been called genocide, that every force and discrimination is applied to Kurdish men, women and children, to destroy them as a people in fact. As they have not a Mulla Mustapha or as good a defensive position they can stage no armed resistance. It is hard to believe that, say, Bedouin tribesmen could replace them if they were moved bodily, or would want to, but of such a kind apparently is Arab nationalistic policy in Syria at the present time. The Kurds, as Kurds, are to be got rid of in one way or another, or so it seems.

UNITY IS ESSENTIAL

Whatever happens, then, the Kurds must stand together if they

are not to be "eaten up" by modern methods of extermination, psychological as well as physical, should warfare fail to do it. Schemes are thought out by their enemies, aided by any Kurdish disunity. Nevertheless, the ancient wisdom and long tradition of survival possessed by the Kurds should not allow them to be fooled by the strange meaningless words - to give them thoughts away from unity - that are the common weapons of today.

REVOLUTION OR REVELATION?

Man is superior to animals and may indeed survive because of his brain, but he still remains in danger of extinction because of his tongue and ears and the amplified decibels of verbiage that can now assail us, and nowhere escapes it. A world which should work in harmony without destroying Suez canals or labours of the past hurls insults and slogans with illwill. They are just of today, mean nothing in real human progress, though to simple folk they are put forward to cloak misdeed as virtue. Take all the "revolutions" with pathetic losses of life, and meaning nothing a century hence, the only one of note in the long term the industrial revolution, for it left the world different. To engineers like myself, revolutions have to be multiple - 4000 rpm for your car, 17000 for jet aircraft; the word at least has meaning, in this context. A Kurdish friend, not so hot on his English, once mispronounced the word as "the Iraqi Revelation", and I thought his was a better word than the one intended.

Surely man's survival has been

largely due to his primordial talent of producing his food by sowing and reaping as well as by hunting. As time has gone on, there have been constant improvements on his first technique, and this, in a nutshell, or in a wheat grain, is the basic progress of man. Of course to a contented existence there are many sides, but as proof of the fundamental nature of what has just been said, there is a Kurdish proverb which says, "where a man's bread is his loyalty must lie". Thus it is well to look closely and respectfully at those countries of the world that produce the greatest abundance of the world's food - with some to spare for others - and regard with suspicion those that, for whatever reason other than cataclysms of nature, do not. The North American continent, for instance, does the job well. It may justly resent the spread, by war or threat, of systems that talk spuriously and don't grow as much or as peacefully.

AN IMPORTANT PLACE

Thus the Kurds, as typified by Mulla Mustapha, a man knowing his job and doing it well with Kurdish obstinacy and bravery, seem wise enough to appraise the world and the peoples and doctrines round them. They must be given the chance to exert the influence that their central geographical position deserves. Their ancient home is near the centre of gravity of the land masses of the planet. It is near, or at, the birthplace of the world's first religions with their immense influence. These may be different in name and in ritual but all have remarkably similar codes of conduct,

one and all warning us against man's greatest temptation since Adam and Eve, "thou shalt not covet". If the world heeded this edict alone, it would manage!

Those who best know them feel sure that the Kurds have an important place to take in the world of tomorrow. To survive to do this, however, they must first adjust their internal differences today.

A KURDISH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY


Taufiq Wahby and C.J. Edmonds


Oxford University Press, 42s.

The Kurdish of this Dictionary is the standard language of belles-lettres, journalism, official and private correspondence, and formal speech as it has developed, on the basis of the dialect of Sulaimani, since 1918, when Kurdish was established as an official language of the administration and of primary education in Northern Iraq; it is, moreover, the language adopted in Persia for Kurdish broadcasts and government-sponsored publications.

The Roman spelling used is a transliteration of a modified Arabic alphabet devised by Taufiq Wahby and is to be adopted by the Iraqi Ministry of Education for use in Schools.

This is the first Kurdish dictionary to be published in a Western European language since 1879. It should interest not only students of Kurdish but philologists in general.





KURDISTAN

ECHELLE 1:4.000.000



We

*the suicide fighters,
heroes of the nation,
lions of black times*

*We shall sacrifice our
lives and our property
for the sake
of liberated Kurdistan.*

*If the enemy shall set
foot upon our land*

*We shall make a burning
pyre of the spot
upon which he treads
And shall drive him out
soon enough*

*Across our frontiers —
we, the suicide fighters.*

*We shall wreak vengeance
upon our enemy,
the vengeance
of the Kurds
and of Kurdistan.*

*We shall wreak vengeance
upon the many
guilty hands
which sought
to destroy the Kurds*

*We shall plough the soil
of Kurdistan with shells*

*That shall lob down from
these mountain ridges*

*And that shall serve
as a lesson for the
generations to follow.*

Hymn of the Kurdish fighters

THE BALLAD
OF
PESH MERGA

Diary OF A KURD

OFFICERS AND BUSINESSMEN

The war in Kurdistan has given ample opportunities for Iraqi officers further to enrich themselves. Vast sums of money are at their disposal, ostensibly for the purpose of recruiting mercenaries in order to fight Pesh Merga. There is no way of checking the number of mercenaries they actually employ and their number is constantly inflated to ensure that there will be enough to satisfy the officers' coffers. In fact many Iraqi officers have become mini-businessmen. They own housing estates, bid for commercial contracts and, more important, they exploit the army's monopoly of political power by obtaining export-import licences which are duly sold at exorbitant prices. No wonder there is a powerful officers' lobby which advocates the continuation of the war against Kurdistan. This situation has aroused the indignation of the genuine business community to such an extent that the Chamber of Commerce in Baghdad recently proposed that all those persons who engaged in commerce part-time after 1958 (when the officers took power) should be disqualified from registering as businessmen. Not unexpectedly the Minister of Economics (an officer) flatly turned down the proposal, because, as he so vividly put it, "it was not in the public interest".

CONSTITUTION, IRAQI STYLE

Mentioning officers, I came across an item of news which would have been amusing had it not been for the fact that peoples of Kurdistan and Iraq are the real victims of it. According to an announcement from Baghdad, a body by the name of the Higher Defence Council has decided that the limitation of Arif II's term to one year - laid down when he was elected to succeed his brother Arif I - was unconstitutional. Now it is legitimate to ask who elected Arif II as president in the first place? Answer: The Higher Defence Council. We may further enquire about the membership of this grandiose-sounding body. It comprises the following: Arif II, plus the Chief of Staff, the Minister of Defence and the army's divisional commanders. What a fine representative and judicial body to pronounce on the constitutionality or otherwise of issues. This decision, in effect, means that the President asserts absolute power to reappoint himself for as many terms as he pleases. And the officers of the Iraqi junta have the audacity to call this sort of decision constitutional. Well, if that is constitutional, then whoever invented constitutionalism originally must be turning feverishly in his grave.

KSSE MEETING IN LONDON

The Kurdish Students' Society in Europe (KSSE), U.K. Branch, held its annual conference in April at Kingsway Hall, London. It was a lively occasion for the members and their guests. Many important topics were discussed, particularly the urgent need to increase the Society's activities concerning publicising the Kurdish problem and establishing closer contacts with various organisations in Britain. Undoubtedly there is plenty of scope for enlisting moral as well as material support for our just cause among the British public. For example, student unions and trade unions ought to be much better informed about Kurdish affairs than at present. What is urgently required is for the Kurdish students to come out of their torpor and devote more time and energy for the achievement of these essential activities.

KING À LA CARTE

From a recent book, "The Secret Life of T.E. Lawrence", by Colin Simpson and Phillip Knightly:

"In London Lawrence was eventually persuaded to become special adviser on the Middle East to Churchill, the Colonial Secretary. Lloyd George, dismayed at the muddle created by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, and Edwin Montagu, Secretary for India, had instructed Churchill to bring order in the area. Together Churchill and Lawrence achieved a settlement notable for its cynical manipulation of democratic processes.

Their first problem had been to nominate a king for Iraq. Over dinner in the Ship Restaurant, Whitehall, Churchill and Lawrence decided on Feisal, who, as St. John Philby recalled, was owed a throne as part of his reward for agreeing to the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine".

I'LL NEVER FORGET WHAT'S 'IS NAME

BBC and the Middle East: The following memorandum - signed by the Chief Assistant of World Service Presentation - has been circulated to all announcers in the BBC World Service: Her Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf has mentioned very gently to the Foreign Office, and the Foreign Office has mentioned very gently to me, that President Arif's name has more than once in recent weeks acquired an incorrect stress on the second syllable. This is said to have occurred in the World Service, though the dates and times are not vouchsafed. The Resident points out, ever so gently, that the word 'arif' accented on the second syllable, signifies, in the Arabic tongue, 'sergeant' or 'corporal' or 'supervisor of irrigation works'. The faintest whisper has been heard to the effect that the Resident's English phrase for the third of these meanings may be something of a euphemism. I therefore venture to remind you, with the most delicate gentility, that all recommendations agree in placing the stress firmly on the first syllable."

Paris Note:

During the recent upheavals at the Sorbonne, seen on a lecture room wall: "Kurdistan Libre! Sorbonne Libre!"

Kurdica Essay

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE POLITICS OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS

An important phenomenon in the politics of the twentieth century is the increasing trend for newly independent nations to be ruled by military dictatorships. The process has been accelerated since the Second World War. The phenomenon is not entirely recent, however; Latin America and South America have experienced it for a long time. Now the Middle East and Africa have joined in this trend. Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Congo are all examples of countries where the military leaders have a firm grip on the political affairs of those countries.

It is difficult to generalise about the various military regimes which exist in the world. Even Europe suffers from the disease: Greece and Spain. There is certainly no clear-cut model to be presented. But one can see certain common patterns which can be generally applied to many cases where the military play a dominant part in the affairs of a country.

In the first place, a country may lack socio-economic cohesion, which is essential in order to form a government based on the consent of the people. The economic backwardness is the most popular rationale for military leaders to grab power. They claim that party politics and parliamentary life are luxuries their countries cannot

afford to possess in the present position of economic backwardness. The Army must therefore take the lead in the industrialisation process, and also must change the social system radically in order to achieve an efficient economic society. The Egyptian Army officers have penetrated into all forms of civilian administration since the coup d'état of 1952. President Ayub of Pakistan is the example of the self-appointed rescuer of the people from the evils of party politics.

Another reason for the increasing role of the military in politics is that in most of the newly independent countries, there is the absence of a vocal civilian political elite which is prepared to take the responsibility for running the country. The Army officers, many of whom take short training courses abroad, consider themselves the guardians of their society. Congo is the common example of the deficiency of educated personnel to run its government.

Another factor which has contributed to the consolidation of military regimes in many developing countries has been the manner in which foreign aid has been provided as an instrument in world politics, regardless of the way in which that aid was to be distributed.

The Cold War has enhanced the position of the military in another respect. Governments have been provided with vast quantities of weapons to fight real or imaginary enemies. Hence the military have at their disposal the means to aggrandize their positions.

In addition, the local and regional disputes between states over frontiers and lost territory have led to the enhancement of the position of the military. It is argued in this sort of situation that the country must consolidate itself under one effective leader to repel some external menace; Kashmir has often been used in Pakistani politics in this way.

The consequences of military takeovers can be far-reaching. There is the tendency of the military rulers to ignore constitutional methods and rely instead on their own strong-arm tactics to push through policies and maintain order. The inevitable reaction of opposition groups is also unconstitutional, for the obvious reason that it takes two to play the constitution game; in the absence of the ballot box, opposition resorts to bayonets. Hence the self-perpetuating process of coups and counter-coups. There are instances where a civilian group manages to oust the military from power through popular action and restore civilian rule. Sudan is an example.

In the case of Iraq, the military took a leading role in overthrowing the royal regime on 14th July 1958. But as soon as that aim was achieved, bickering started among the leaders of the

coups, exacerbated by the jockeying and competition for power among the numerous political groups. It was obvious that the new government had no coherent social and economic platform on which to stand. Furthermore, the eccentric personality of Kassim helped to create a confused political atmosphere. His outlook and attitude towards political problems facing the country was that of a typical army officer: no political tactics, but a belief in attack and destroy methods. When in 1961 the Kurds raised their grievances to the Government, Kassim reacted violently and instantaneously. Thus the Kurdish war started. Of course there is more to the Kurdish problem than this analysis suggests, i.e. the question of two nationalities within one state; but experience has shown that military leaders are the least qualified to deal with such a delicate situation; witness Iraq and Nigeria. For even military leaders worry about public support; and the easiest way to gain that is to whip up chauvinistic feelings among the section of the population to which the government belongs and to make a different section serve as a scapegoat for all the evils of the country.

An effective policy countering the trend towards military rule must be based on socio-economic factors. First of all, the military profession should be de-glamorised and less pampered than at present in many developing countries. Another method is to widen the educational training of officers, who do not normally get a thorough political education in addition to their military training.

C. A. K. MANIFESTO

1 THE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE KURDS AS A PEOPLE
MUST BE RECOGNIZED AND GUARANTEED.

2 THE NAME, "KURDISTAN", MUST BE RECOGNIZED
AND ITS BOUNDARIES WITHIN IRAQ DELINEATED IN
KEEPING WITH HISTORICAL, GEOGRAPHICAL AND ETHNIC REALITIES.

3 KURDISTAN MUST BE GRANTED THE FULLEST
AUTONOMY WITHIN THE IRAQI REPUBLIC.

4 THE KURDISH LANGUAGE MUST BE RECOGNIZED AS
THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF IRAQI KURDISTAN.

5 KURDISH CULTURE MUST BE ALLOWED TO DEVELOP
AND THE RIGHT OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE RECOGNIZED TO
EDUCATE THEIR CHILDREN IN THEIR OWN
LANGUAGE AND BRING THEM UP IN THEIR OWN CULTURE.

6 THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF THE KURDS MUST BE RAISED AND THEY MUST BE GIVEN EQUAL AND JUST OPPORTUNITY FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. OIL ROYALTIES ACCRUING FROM OIL PRODUCTION IN KURDISH TERRITORY MUST BE DIVERTED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE KURDISH NATION, IN A JUST PROPORTION AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SIZE OF THE KURDISH POPULATION IN IRAQ.

7 THE KURDS MUST BE ALLOWED TO MAINTAIN THEIR OWN DISTINCT POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES WHICH WILL REMAIN IN KURDISTAN AS GUARANTEE OF ANY PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

8 THE IRAQI CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MUST BE SO COMPOSED AS TO GIVE AUTHENTIC REPRESENTATION TO BOTH THE ARAB AND KURDISH NATIONALITIES. MILITARY DICTATORSHIP MUST BE ABANDONED AND DEMOCRATIC LIBERTIES MUST BE RESPECTED.

9 SHOULD THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE ABOVE DEMANDS, THE KURDISH PEOPLE WILL STRIVE TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION, UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

The Essential aims of the Kurdish Revolution

A tale from Baghdad

Detractors from the regime in Iraq must take note. Apologists for the regime point to a significant recent case which shows, it is argued, the proper way in which the Government dispenses justice to the citizens of the country. The story goes back to the days of President Abdul Salam Arif - Arif I - when the Iraq and Kuwait Governments decided in 1963 to end their long-drawn-out wrangle and settle their differences amicably. There were, however, certain conditions attached to the final agreement concluded. One of these conditions made public at the time was that Kuwait Government should grant Iraq a thirty-million-pound loan, which "was not expected to be repaid in foreseeable future". Thereby a new chapter opened in Iraq-Kuwait relations. And this would have been the end of a happy episode of diplomatic success but for some recent revelations following the sudden death of Arif I in 1966.

It appears that there was a personal aspect involved in the negotiations leading to the agreement between Iraq and Kuwait. The latter generously offered Arif I a sum of two million pounds as a token tribute to the President's relentless efforts in bringing peace and friendship among sisterly Arab Governments. Not unnaturally, it was not thought to be in the public interest to disclose this fact at the time. The Kuwait Government offered to deposit the

two million in a Swiss private account, as normally is the practice. But Arif I rejected the suggestion outright on the grounds that his patriotism would be severely shaken if he did not show confidence in Iraqi banks. He therefore deposited the two million gift in Rafidain Bank, Baghdad, as an ordinary private account. Fate, however, proved to be too cruel for the energetic President to draw on the special fund at Rafidain Bank. Thus the sand storm and the helicopter crash...

This tragic event created a few problems in Iraq, not all entirely political. For example, there was Arif I's legacy. His widow approached the Rafidain Bank and demanded the two million pounds bequeathed to her by her late husband. Unfortunately, the Bank did not give her the money and claimed that it belonged to the State.

Alas, upholders of individual liberty and justice intervened on behalf of the poor bereaved widow. They took up her case in court. And the hero of our story is none other than the present minister for Foreign Affairs, Ismail Kairullah, who is a lawyer by profession. The Minister represented the widow during the court hearings of the case. By all accounts, he conducted a brave and brilliant plea for the plaintiff and defended her rightful claim to the disputed money. The court, after a long and heart-

searching period of deliberation, decided that the widow was indeed entitled to the money deposited by her husband in Rafidain Bank.

The moral of the above tale (if the reader hasn't guessed by now) is: The regime in Iraq not only ensures that justice is done, but, more important, that justice is seen to be done!

Spectator



JUST PUBLISHED: New issue of:
THE KURDISH JOURNAL
Vol.V, Nos.1 and 2, March, June 1968

Contents:

The Kurds and "Arab Socialism"

The Etymology of the Name Baghdad
Taufiq Wahby

Facts on the Kurds:
Reply to "The Story of the Kurds"
Jamil Rojbeyani

The Jews of Kurdistan
Yona Sabar

Documents and Excerpts:


Report on the Plan for the
Establishment of State Farms
in the Hasaka Province.

The Programme of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party

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C. A. K.

Komele y Pêxistin y Kurdistan le Inglistan

Committee for the Advancement of Kurdistan-U.K.

C A K PLEA ON SYRIA

CAK issued the following appeal to various international organisations in December 1967:

Dear Sir,

This is an urgent appeal, on behalf of the Committee for the Advancement of Kurdistan -U.K., in order to draw your attention to the tragic plight of the Kurdish people in Syria. They are subjected to drastic, inhuman measures initiated by the military junta ruling Syria. According to recent press reports, the Government is intensifying a campaign with the aim of Arabising the Kurdish area. The means which the Government has chosen to achieve this end are extremely ruthless, and flagrantly contrary to the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights. Thousands of Kurdish families have been deprived of their homes and their land on the Syrian-Turkish and Syrian-Iraqi borders. Others have lost their Syrian citizenship overnight. The full details of this campaign are given in the statement attached with this letter.

It is quite evident that the Syrian Government is set out to annihilate the Kurdish community in that part of Kurdistan. Their policy can only be compared with that of the South African Government regarding the African population. The Syrian regime blatantly encourages racial discrimination in social,

economic, political and educational fields. This situation obviously constitutes a case where Arab nationalism has turned into a chauvinistic and militaristic creed, used by a military junta in the hope of destroying the roots of the Kurdish nation in their own homeland.

This kind of aggression is clearly prohibited by accepted conventions of international law. It is indeed ironic that these tragic measures should be taken by the Syrian Government when this year has been designated as Human Rights Year. Therefore we urge you and your organisation to take heed of the serious situation in Syrian Kurdistan, and hope that you will be able to raise your voice in defence of the just cause of the Syrian Kurds. Public opinion must condemn the Syrian regime. Let us rescue thousands of Kurdish families from a miserable fate.

A positive step to assist in this respect is to send a fact-finding mission to the relevant area in order to ascertain the exact circumstances of the Kurdish community in Syria. Our Committee is prepared to give you all the assistance you require to achieve this.

CAK-UK

22nd December, 1967.

WHY A KURDISH WAR ?

from H.E. Taufiq Wahby

In Time and Tide recently a suggestion was made by Mr. F.J. Goulding that my knowledge of the Kurds in Iraq, as a Kurd and as a former Minister of the Iraq Government, could add to your news item about a regrettable Iraq Army attack upon the Kurds.

The Kurds are an ancient Indo-European people with a language of their own and distinctive customs and dress. As mountaineers and guerilla fighters they defend themselves, if necessary, with great military skill and determination.

But they have no tanks or aeroplanes or means of initiating war, and they would of course prefer peace to develop their rugged country rather than have to defend it.

Normally the Kurds do maintain peace with their neighbours, they welcome development of their lands and resources, the construction of roads and dams and improvement of their conditions, etc.

Unfortunately in the last few years the dictatorial and chauvinistic Governments of Iraq have been using the valuable oil royalties of the country to buy many kinds of modern arms with the apparent object of subjugating and exterminating the Kurds. Recently they began to use religion also for the same object. Thus a gloomy war of repression has replaced the constructive programme and the stability and prosperity of a few years ago.

The present thought of many prominent and loyal Iraqis, however, is how, with honour, to stop this war and spend the misused oil revenues in a better way. The sooner a way is found, the better for all.

The first step would be to cease air attacks on Kurdish villages and withdraw the Army to its quarters, the next to draw up a pact that Arab and Kurdish parties would agree to keep, and which must be passed through an Iraqi parliament elected immediately and freely by the Iraqi nation.

OBITUARY

We regret to announce the death of Mr. Amin J. Said, who died on 13th May 1968. in Moscow. He was a member of the Executive Committee of KSSE in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Said was born in 1940 in Sulaimani and was an active member of the Kurdistan Students Union. In 1959 he went to the Soviet Union and was elected Secretary to the Branch, where he played a very active role in KSSE. Only recently he graduated as a Civil Engineer.

The Iraqi Embassy in Moscow refused to have anything to do with making arrangements for sending the remains to Kurdistan. However, the Soviet Government very kindly offered to undertake this.

May we offer our condolence to his family and relatives. He will be a very great loss to KSSE.

★ ★ ★ Briefly ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

FREE PRESS IN KURDISTAN

Many publications have started appearing in the liberated Kurdistan. They are mostly in Kurdish. First, there is the magazine "Dangi Pesh Merga" (Voice of Pesh Merga). Also, there is "Dangi Kurdistan". Then there is a newspaper by the name of "Safin" and another one called "Risgari" (Liberation).

Though they are all concerned with major political issues in Kurdistan, they all put special emphasis on local news and also undertake educational functions. Of course, there are national papers, mainly "Khabat", which is the organ of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, published in both Kurdish and Arabic.

INTERNATIONAL JURISTS

The Bulletin of International Commission of Jurists, No.31, contained an article on the Kurds under the title of "The Kurdish Problem". It deals with "The History of the Kurds", "The Kurds in Iraq", "The Recent War" and "The Kurds Elsewhere". The article concludes with these words: "If the world today is to realise its determination that problems should be resolved by the Rule of Law rather than by the old Rule of Force, it must establish international machinery whereby the rights of ethnic minorities and unpopular groups living within a state may be protected". The International

Commission of Jurists is a non-governmental organisation which has Consultative status with the United Nations and UNESCO. The Commission seeks to foster understanding of and respect for the Rule of Law.

HAPPY KURDISH NEW YEAR


Nowroz was celebrated in all parts of Kurdistan on 21st March, which marks the beginning of the New Year. The Kurdistan Broadcasting Station transmitted special programmes to celebrate the occasion. There were several rallies organised by Pesh Merga, in Balek, Dashti Hawler, Penjween, Koya, Sharbajer and Germian.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST ILLITERACY

For the last seven years schooling has been an unfortunate casualty of the war in Kurdistan-Iraq. The danger is that a whole future generation in Kurdistan might be deprived of proper education. The Kurdish Revolutionary administration has tried to cope with this grave situation. But there still remains a great deal to be done. Lately, task forces have been designated to various areas to fight illiteracy. The cadres of the Kurdistan Democratic Party undertake most of these activities. In addition, appeals have been made to relevant humanitarian international organisations, such as UNESCO, for aid to overcome the problem.

KURDS IN SWEDEN

The Kurdish Refugees in Sweden issued an appeal in March regarding "the question of national oppression and discrimination against the Kurdish people in Syria, which definitely amounts to Genocide". In recent years the number of Kurdish refugees in Sweden has increased due to the humane and genuine hospitality of the Swedish Government and people towards those Kurds who have become victims of political oppression in Kurdistan. Viva Swedish-Kurdish solidarity!




- Surely we watched this last week.

KSSE GENERAL EXECUTIVE

On the invitation of the Polish Youth Organisation, the General Executive Committee of the Kurdish Students' Society in Europe is going to hold its biannual meeting in Warsaw towards the end of August. The agenda includes the setting of a date and a place for the Society's next annual Congress, in addition to discussing current matters.

ARIF, JUNIOR, APPOINTED

The son of ex-President Arif I has been appointed as the assistant military attache in London, presumably as a consolation prize. Let's hope he does not gain enough influence to stage a comeback for his father.





Reviews



THE KURDS
An Historical and Political Study
by Hassan Arfa
Oxford University Press, 35s.

General Arfa has had long and firsthand experience of the Kurdish problem both as a soldier and as a diplomat. He was Chief of Staff of the Iranian Army from 1944-1946 and Ambassador to Turkey from 1958-1961. He has written an interesting study of the Kurds. It deserves to be carefully read. The author has obviously spent considerable time and effort in gathering the necessary material. This is not to say that the book is entirely successful in tackling its subject.

In the preface to his book the author says: "The reader will wonder how it is possible for an Iranian officer, who for years fought against the Kurds in the frontier districts, to write an objective and impartial account of their history, position and aspirations, and not introduce a bias in favour of his own country, which includes a Kurdish minority about one million strong". How, indeed? One looks in vain for an answer to this question throughout the book; the only explanation we get is the author's personal assurance that he has "restricted himself to an account of known and undeniable historical facts". The chapters do not, unfortunately, vindicate this encouraging promise: in the same breath with his assurance, the

author shows bias by giving the figure for the Kurdish population in Iran as "about one million", which is a highly questionable estimate. And this seems to be the pattern throughout the book: "facts" which constitute erroneous and contentious statements. Indeed, the author appears to confuse facts with interpretations. There are many examples. He says that the two chief Kurdish dialects are Zaza and Kermanji. Zaza, as a matter of fact, is only a minor sub-dialect in Kurdish (See article by T. Wahby in the magazine Galawej, No. 4, April 1940, Baghdad, for the classification of the Kurdish dialects and his Kurdish Studies, Part I). It is also claimed on page 4 that "Zaza and Gorani are only spoken dialects". If the author had cared to check, he would have found a sizeable Gorani and Zazai literature. Even most of the Kermanji writers have used Gorani dialect in their folk tales which they have written in verse. Further, the author says that "The administrative and technical words" in Kurdish language "are practically all borrowed from Persian and Arabic"; and, "most of the words have Persian roots". It is quite true that Kurdish has borrowed numerous words from the North-West mid-Iranian dialects to which Kurdish belongs. In fact, Persian and Turkish contain far more Arabic than Kurdish does. It is simply inaccurate to say that most Kurdish words have Persian roots, since both Kurdish and

Persian are derived from the same ancestor, and hence one cannot originate from the other, although modern Kurdish is more archaic than modern Persian.

In discussing life in Kurdistan the author gives a bizarre picture, e.g.: "In summer the lower slopes are dry and bare, and the flocks which form the chief means of livelihood of the population must go high up the slopes to find fodder, obliging their owners to lead a nomadic life, climbing up the mountains in summer and coming down into the valleys and plains in winter". I would have thought that a writer with personal experience of Kurdistan would have avoided this sort of naive and pseudo-romantic view of the country. It is well known that the main body of the Kurdish people lead an urban and rural life, with very little trace of nomadism. Nomadic life is more prevalent among neighbouring nations than among the Kurds.


The political survey of events is also unsatisfactory, particularly the section dealing with Kurdistan-Iraq affairs. The author says that Shaikh Mahmud was exiled to Nasiriyah for the second time after his first exile in 1930, for "his political intrigues". This is not true. Shaikh Mahmud was never allowed to return to Sulaimani after his subdual in 1932, but in May, 1941 he took advantage of the confusion created by the Rashid Ali coup in Baghdad and fled Baghdad to return to Sulaimani region, where he continued to stay in his village Darikali. On pages 132-133 the writer asserts that Daud Jaf

crossed into Iran "with several thousand armed followers". Yet it took two vehicles to transport Daud Jaf and his family and his followers to Iran!

In Chapter 4 there is a very sketchy account of the Kurdish political movement in Kurdistan-Iraq. On page 130, it is stated that Mulla Mostafa Barzani, together with some of the members of the former Heva (sic) party, founded the Kurdistan Democratic Party in 1958. The K.D.P. was in fact founded in 1946 (see "The Kurdish Republic of 1946", by William Eagleton, which is, surprisingly, cited by the author in his bibliography).

I think General Arfa's efforts would have been more rewarding had he attempted to write a book of his personal experiences and contacts in Kurdistan, instead of his version of an "objective" and "impartial" account of Kurdish politics and history.

M. Bapîr



A national emblem of Kurdistan

THE TIMES FRIDAY FEBRUARY 9 1968

THE TIMES DIARY

Why not Cockburn
De Gaulle's doubt
Beatles' 'official'

The French and the Kurds

THE Kurds have suddenly woken up to the fact that the French Government is probably about to start selling Mirage fighter-bombers to Iraq which might, of course, be used against Israel in the next war but would almost certainly be used against the Kurds in the meantime.

The French, of course, will turn as deaf an ear to the Kurds' protests as the Russians have in the past—and the British and Americans before them. The Iraqis are always bombing the Kurds, and the advanced nations of the world are always willing to sell them arms with which to do it.

Deeply involved

Israeli protests will be more vehement and will be more widely heard. The French Government enforces an embargo on arms shipments to the countries involved in the June war, but has chosen to limit its definition of those countries involved to Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

In fact, Iraq was deeply involved in the war, lost many aeroplanes, troops and tanks—the Iraqi Army was well established on the west bank of the Jordan (this was one of the causes of the war) and remains now firmly entrenched in Jordan.

It is thus chicanery to claim Iraq deserves to be treated differently from Egypt—or Israel, whose 50 Mirages, largely paid for, are now being lined up in Toulouse. But all's fair in trade and war—and France has already won a major oil concession from Iraq and hopes to win another.

THE TIMES THURSDAY FEBRUARY 8 1968

Kurdish leader appeals to de Gaulle

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT—Paris, Feb. 7

Mullah Mustafa Barzani, leader of the Kurdish nationalist movement, has written to President de Gaulle begging him not to give arms to Iraq unless the Kurdish problem is settled first.

The text of this letter became known in Paris today, and is clearly timed to coincide with the arrival of President Arif of Iraq for his state visit.

"You freed your own country", the Kurdish leader tells President de Gaulle in his letter, "therefore you cannot but be sympathetic to the almost hopeless resistance which the Kurdish mountain people have been carrying on for six years in northern Iraq. . . . You have not hesitated to denounce the Vietnam war: I am sure the fate of the Kurdish people is not less dear to you than that of the Vietnamese people."

This appeal is by no means without an echo in French public opinion. There is an "aid committee for the suffering population of Iraqi Kurdistan", which has just published a statement deploring the Government's alleged intention to supply arms, and urging it in any event to subordinate arms deliveries "to a formal condition that they should not be used against the Kurdish population". The list of signatories includes such

normally staunch Gaullists as M. Léo Hamon, deputy, and M. François Mauriac, the writer.

Several French newspapers devoted leading articles today to criticisms of the Government's cultivation of the Iraq leader, and mention the Kurdish problem as a reason for holding back.

The right-wing *L'Aurore* accuses President Arif of "pursuing the pitiless massacre of one-third of Iraq's population: the Kurdish people", and the left-wing *Combat* remarks that "Baghdad has on its conscience a genocide which is not old, that of the Kurdish people, and which iniquity and monstrosity ought to give food for thought to General de Gaulle, who is so sensitive to the lot of oppressed minorities".

THE GUARDIAN
Friday February 16 1968

France sells armoured cars to Iraq

Paris, February 15

It was confirmed today that France is to deliver to Iraq 70 light armoured cars and is still negotiating the sale of 54 Mirage supersonic jets worth about £63 millions. The sale of the Panther armoured cars was confirmed by what was described as "authorised sources."

Iraq is said to want the delivery of the Mirages to begin in 1969 and also seeks French aid in the training of aircraft engineers and pilots. The negotiations are being complicated by the French embargo on the Mirages ordered by Israel two years ago and the fact that to meet the Iraq timetable for delivery, the Dassault factory would have to delay deliveries to the French Air Force.

DEADLOCK—AND REBEL KURDS GO BACK TO WAR

The rebel Kurdish army in Iraq is preparing for a resumption of full-scale hostilities against the government, according to reliable reports reaching me.

Peace negotiations have been continuing at intervals between the Kurds and the Government since the cease-fire two years ago. "These talks have now broken down," a spokesman for the Kurdish revolution told me. "No agreement could be reached on the degree of autonomy that should be granted to Kurdistan—and we also believed there were insufficient guarantees that Government promises would be kept."

LORD KILBRACKEN

There have been armed clashes in the Arbil area already—the first fighting since the cease-fire. In one, the Kurds claim 13 enemy killed.

To the front

In Bagdad, the two Kurdish leaders who were given posts in the Iraq Cabinet—Mr. Fattah Shaily and Mr. Ihsan Shirzad—resigned ten days ago. Their appointment last autumn was meant as a concession to the Kurds in Iraq, who had, however, pressed for greater representation—at least four of the 23 members.

Shirzad was the personal

nominee of General Mutaqa Barzani, the supreme revolutionary leader.

The Kurdish newspaper, Al Taakhi, the largest in Bagdad, has been suppressed by the Government.

Since the cease-fire, the Kurdish soldiers (who are known by the nickname, "Those who fight till death") have returned to farms and work. Barzani has now put his entire army at readiness and his troops are returning to the front.

The Kurdish army has increased its strength and fire power since the truce, largely—

it is said—through the purchase of arms from Iraqi defectors and is confident of holding any attack. But it has been able to do little in the vital fields of education and medicine.

There are still only four doctors among almost a million inhabitants and almost all schools have been closed since the war began in 1961.

10 killed in Iraq ambushes

FROM OUR MIDDLE EAST CORRESPONDENT

BEIRUT, APRIL 14

The Daily Telegraph, Thursday, May 30, 1968 21

Ways in which Kurds need more support

SIR—Your reference to the Kurds (May 18) and the probable continuance of the attacks upon them by the Iraqi Army and Air Force—which have already extended over six years—is timely. Journalistic influence on behalf of the Kurds and knowledge of their plight throughout the world is far greater than it was, but it may still not be enough to deter Iraq from this ancient vendetta when the wealth and equipment to fight a poor yet determined foe is theirs. Further it is profitable for those con-

cerned in it to pay real or imaginary mercenaries whose theoretical duty is to join battle with the Kurds; also the mountain villages were, and may still be, regarded as ideal practice grounds for bombing, with no retaliation.

It is sad to think that in a bid to restore Arab world prestige Iraqis still take part in this one-sided, and in the eyes of the world despicable, kind of warfare. As an alternative the Kurds could be given the degree of autonomy already in fact promised. This would enable them to use the beauties of their mountains to attract tourists (not turn them away), to provide schools and hospitals for their people where today there are none and only four doctors, to develop hydro-electric dams and survey and develop their mineral and agricultural resources. Then instead of about 50 Kurdish students in the UK and of over 1,000 Iraqi students, and, of those 50, half of them paying themselves, many times

that number could seek their education here or where they wished. Some emphasis should be put on this country, and our universities, being the most sought for because British engineers and administrators of the Iraq Mandatory régime were early supporters of the Kurds. They had to accept the Kurds for what they were, a proud and very independent minority. Hence British policy and recommendation till we left was that they should be treated so.

The most famous of Kurds, Saladin's claim to lasting fame—exactly like that of the present Mulla Mustapha Barzani—rests not so much in his being a competent commander in war but that he fought with chivalry; leaving women, children and prisoners unharmed. This quite undisputed characteristic of the Kurds made a deep appeal to all British soldiers and airmen who at times opposed them. Western purchase of oil, bringing wealth beyond dreams, to the Arabs of today, makes the destruction and misery in Kurdistan surely as undesirable and unnecessary as anything in this age could be.

Even to vary the prescription Iraq should try something else—to let Mulla Mustapha put in motion his autonomous Kurdistan with the Kurdish population's share of the oil royalties that are their due and scrap the war completely—just to see how it works out—is something he would underwrite. Why not try it?

Yours faithfully,

A. M. HAMILTON

17, Dartmouth Street, S.W.1.

Letters to the Editor

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Stop Press: BAGHDAD COUP SPECIAL

As Kurdica was going to the press, a group of army officers staged yet another coup d'etat in Baghdad. Our apologies if some of the material in Kurdica is dated; however, it is not an easy task to keep pace with events in coup-prone countries. (One cannot justifiably blame coup engineers for not giving the Press a forewarning!). To twist a well-known phrase, "That's coup business".


PRE-COUP PSYCHOLOGY

It has become evident in the aftermath of the coup that basically two groups planned and executed the takeover. The first is a faction of the Baath Party, the second a group of ambitious army officers. The first group is represented by the new President Hassan Al-Bakr; Salih M. Amash, the Minister of the Interior; and Hardan Al-Tikriti, Commander-in-Chief and Commander of the Air Force. The Prime Minister, Col. Abdul Razzak Al-Naif, represents the second group in the move, which is a mixture of young officers in the Army Intelligence Service and a number of officers among the Presidential Guard. In fact four officers in the Guards Unit - known as the Wild Four - were exerting considerable political pressure on Arif even prior to the coup. It is a fact that under their very prompting, several ministers were dismissed and others appointed in their place by Arif. Only two weeks

before the coup, as rumour was gathering in Baghdad about conspiracies being hatched against Arif, the four officers cunningly offered to leave the country and accept diplomatic posts abroad if Arif didn't trust them. This served as a perfect camouflage for the plotters. Arif's suspicions were dispelled. And since many of the conspirators held influential posts in the Intelligence Service, particularly Naif, Arif was left in the dark about their movements. Arif's attention was further diverted by exaggerated and romantic stories about an uprising (Cuban style) by the marsh Arabs in the South.

POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS

The new leaders have made all the standard noises about their high-minded intentions to stamp out corruption indulged in by the previous regimes, and the restoration of a 'true democracy'. All the goodies are promised, including free elections, free press and freedom of party and trade union associations. The people, however, have so far shown little response towards the new regime. One cannot really blame them; apathy is the result of their familiarity with this sort of political situation. Their immediate feelings can be summarized as: "we've been through all this before".



TWO PROBLEMS

There are two basic problems facing the regime. The first is the question of restoration of parliamentary life and civil liberties, and the other is the Kurdish problem.

In spite of the sonorous pledges by the new rulers, people are sceptical about their sincerity. A fair indication of this is given by the absence of any declaration setting out a time-table to restore parliamentary life. We haven't been told how they intend to go about fulfilling the electorate promises given. All that has happened so far is that the membership of the so-called Revolution Council has increased to forty members, which does not change the oligarchic nature of the regime. A call for the return of the Army to the barracks may sound unrealistic now; but if there is to be a solution for the country's economic and social problems, civilians must play an active part in the endeavour. Furthermore, the new rulers must learn how to tolerate opposition, and not try to annihilate it, as the previous Baath regime did when it came to power on 8 February 1963.

KURDISTAN POLITICS

The Kurdish leadership has not yet made its comment on the coup. Prior to the 17th July, Kurdo-Iraqi relations had reached a deadlock situation. Many skirmishes had occurred between Pesh Merga troops and the Iraqi Army. But there was no large-scale fighting.

One of the reasons given justifying the coup is that the Arif regime did not solve the Kurdish problem. The new regime, however, do not specify how they are going to solve the problem. Can it be by naked force again? - Although the regime is now too weak to start another military offensive against Kurdistan.

LEST THEY FORGET

The people of Kurdistan still shudder with horror at the mere mention of Baath rule in 1963. On 11th June 1963 the Army started an attack which was unique in its savagery. Members of the Kurdish delegation then negotiating in Baghdad were arrested and subjected to torture, which became a common method of dealing with all political prisoners. Yet the real atrocities were perpetrated in Kurdistan. Numerous cases are fully documented. One of the most tragic episodes occurred inside Sulaimani, where Iraqi troops, led by Brig. Sidiq Mustafa, rounded up 273 Kurdish citizens in one night, and nobody knew their fate until three months later, when it was discovered that 180 of those arrested had been lined up and buried alive by bulldozers. This happened in a place two miles from the centre of Sulaimani, now known as "Girdi Shahidan", The Hill of the Martyrs. The remainder were shot elsewhere. Many of the citizens arrested were either students or teachers. One of them, by the name of Haji Baki, was due to fly to the U. S. A. on a scholarship two days after his arrest. He was a brilliant physics teacher in the secondary school of Sulaimani.

The Iraqi Air Force created havoc in Kurdistan. One of their notorious raids was directed against a ladies' public baths in the city of Koya, where 95 innocent women and children lost their lives.

Yet Kurdistan's resistance persevered even after the 'Sisterly' Baath Government of Syria joined the Iraqi forces against the Kurds. The result of that campaign was the downfall of the Baath regime. It ended a truly grim chapter in the modern history of Iraq and Kurdistan.

These facts need reiterating, because many of the men who conducted the 1963 campaign are back in power after this recent coup. The new president, Hassan Al-Bakr, was Prime Minister then. M. Al-Amas is notorious for describing the campaign against the Kurds as "a picnic". He was then Minister of Defence. Harden Al-Tikriti was the Commander of the Air Force, and hence directly in charge of aerial bombardments.

Politics of revenge are not wise. People should judge political issues on their own merits, rather than on the basis of past grudges. But the essential need is to make sure that the experience of 1963 is not repeated under any circumstances. The Kurds can't afford to be caught unguarded again. Before anything else, therefore, the physical security of Kurdistan must be guaranteed.

WHAT NEXT?

The new Prime Minister has expressed his desire to reach a

solution for the Kurdish problem.


Any Kurd can tell him straight-away that he hasn't made a very good start. Among newly appointed Ministers are two Ministers who represent Iraqi mercenary forces - Jash Muslih and Abdulla Naksbahandi. This is no gesture of goodwill towards the Kurdish people! Yet the new regime still has a chance of doing something genuine about the Kurdish problem. The Kurds could very well have taken advantage of the uncertainty created by the coup and escalated their confrontation with the Iraqi Army. But they exercised self-restraint instead. Let us hope that this was not done in vain.



Dear Citizens : Our new premier
is ... is ... let me check again !

army sacks President

Deposed Iraq President in London



ANOTHER

Ten years ago, when Iraq was the scene of a bloody July revolution, everybody could see what it was about. In 1958 KASSIM and his fellow conspirators murdered the royal family and NURI, because they regarded them as old-fashioned puppets of Britain and because they wanted Iraq to join "the broad stream of Arab nationalism". Nowadays a coup in Baghdad tends to be smaller in scale and in significance. In fact yesterday's events—with the ex-PRESIDENT flying peacefully out of the country with a pension—hardly deserve the name even of a coup, let alone a revolution. What has happened is that once again Iraq has had a change of government in the only way left open to it.

THE OBSERVER, 21 JULY 1968

Iraq coup poses threat to Syria

by our Diplomatic Staff

THE IRAQI coup has sent a shudder of apprehension through the Arab world, especially in Syria. Its swiftness and unexpectedness has served notice that other Arab governments may not be immune to change.

But not even the best-informed Arab commentators are yet agreed about the real nature of the new regime which last week overthrew President Arif. While Arab papers stress that the coup was a purely internal affair, there is a measure of agreement that it was carried out by right-wing Baathists, who are seen as a direct threat to Syria's left-wing Baathist regime.

Significantly, several of the Syrian opposition leaders in exile came into the open for the first time in years after the announcement of the coup in Baghdad.

In Jordan, too, exiled Syrians have thrown caution to the winds and proclaimed their support for the original Baathist ideologist, Michael Aflak.

Our correspondent in Amman reports a group of Baathists there as saying: "The coup is the first step towards true Arab unity and social-

ism." They forecast the possibility of Iraq, Syria and Jordan uniting under right-wing Baathist colours "after a new Baghdad regime has dealt with Damascus."

In Cairo the view was that the Baghdad coup was "Western inspired"—a view bound to gain currency among those who consider that any significant changes in the Arab political set-up at this crucial juncture can only disrupt and weaken the Arab position in its confrontation with Israel.

General Arif has told friends in London, where he is staying, that he plans to join the Palestine freedom fighters "to prove he is a true Arab," but if his offer is not accepted he will go to live in Turkey.

In Iraq tension runs high as the 15,000 soldiers of the Kurdish revolutionary Army have been alerted to discover what intentions the new regime has for settling the long-standing dispute with the Kurds who control two-thirds of Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurds regard the new President and especially his Minister of the Interior as bitter opponents of the Kurdish cause.

It is harder to say what the new Government will stand for and in what way it will differ from the one which has just been got rid of. The state-ments so far put out by Baghdad radio follow a routine pattern: the old regime was unspeakably awful, its leaders a bunch of gangsters and traitors; the new regime is going to do everything that is good, including making war with the Israelis and peace with the Kurds. The Iraq people are reported to have received the news of the coup with joy, but the joy tempered with scepticism. "I heard all these things often in the past," he said.



New Iraqi Premier seeks stronger links with Britain and France

From our Special Correspondent, Bagdad, July 22

Iraq's new Prime Minister, the former Colonel Abdel Razak Al-Naif, now emerging as the leading conspirator behind Wednesday's overthrow of President Aref, made a secret visit to the country's North at the weekend, probably to talk to army units fighting the Kurdish guerrillas.

This underlines the importance the regime places on making peace with the Kurds—two million of Iraq's eight million people—who are fighting for an autonomous homeland incorporating regions of Iraq, Persia, and Turkey. The attitude of the large forces of soldiers fighting this long, vicious war is a crucial consideration for any Bagdad Government with ambitions to move from a military coercion of the tribesmen, which is what President Aref's policy seems to have amounted to.

Meanwhile the new Foreign Minister, Nasser Al Hani, confirmed here today the already widespread belief that the regime of President Bakr will not make any violent changes in foreign policy. "We will honour and endorse all agreements that we had with foreign States," said the Foreign Minister. "The major change is internal."

Nevertheless the coup appears certain to strain Iraq's relations with Egypt. Aref was generally held to be the closest of all Arab leaders to President Nasser. He was in the habit of referring almost all policy decisions to Cairo [three weeks ago Bagdad asked Cairo if it would mind if Iraq started importing Vauxhall cars].

The new regime is led by members of the Right-wing faction of the Ba'ath Socialist party, traditionally antagonistic to President Nasser's still potent influence throughout the Arab world. The Prime Minister was one of the soldiers who suppressed an attempt by pro-Nasser officers to overthrow Aref in June, 1966. But it is clear from the Foreign Minister's comments today that the regime wants the policies of Iraq and Egypt to be merely separate rather than drastically different.



General al-Bakr: Seesaw of obscurity and power.

Excitement gone

TWO PHONE CALLS AND ARIF FELL

The first dispatch out of Baghdad after the Iraq coup

BAGHDAD, July 18.—Tank shells and machine-gun bursts near the presidential palace at 3 a.m. persuaded President Abdul Rahman Arif that the coup against him was to succeed, the Iraqi people were told today.

When the President agreed to surrender, thousands of shots were fired proclaiming victory.

The first account of how the regime was toppled early yesterday morning appeared in two Arabic newspapers and one English-language daily today.

The newspaper *Al Jumhuriya* reported: "Zero hour for the revolution was 3 a.m."

The plan depended on tension within the presidential guard which made it easy for commandos and retired soldiers to enter the palace. In addition there were commandos and soldiers within the palace.

"Through close cooperation between the two groups the revolutionaries were able to move their units, break through the palace walls and direct the guns and machine-guns on its towers which had been trained on the outside, towards the palace building.

Officers' demand


"After the presidential palace had been surrounded and commando forces, led by President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, together with infantry and tank forces had broken in, President Bakr telephoned Abdul Rahman Arif, asking him to surrender to avoid the shedding of innocent blood."

The paper went on: "He declined at first, putting up fragile arguments intended to explore the situation carefully, find out the revolutionaries' resources and gain time."

A FAST
ONE BY THE
BRIGADIER

VICTIMS OF WAR
IN KURDISTAN
200,000 SHELTERLESS
REFUGEES

ATROCITIES OF
NAPALM
BOMBINGS
AGAINST
CIVILIANS




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
Unexploded bombs after Iraqi Air Force attack



**FAR FROM
KURDISTAN !!
200,000 REFUGEES
3,000 VILLAGES
BULLDOZED &
DESTROYED**



*Bishop Hariri, representative
of the Christian Kurds in the Command Council of the Revolution;*



*Woman caught in fire after Iraqi Air Force
razed her village with Napalm bombs*

**Please help victims of the
Kurdish War.**

**Write to: Committee for Advancement
of Kurdistan (C.A.K.)
21 Onslow Gardens, London, SW7**

